



COLLABORATIVE LEARNING PROJECTS

DO NO HARM PROJECT: TRAINER'S MANUAL
TRAINING CASE STUDIES

A Manual of the Do No Harm Project (Local Capacities for Peace Project)
A project of the Collaborative for Development Action, Inc.
and CDA Collaborative Learning Projects

(revised November 2004)

Table of Contents

Case Study

A Case Study: Module II of a Do No Harm Workshop

Case Studies

Food For Work for Rebuilding War-Damaged Homes in Tajikistan

Assisting Displaced People From Bahr el Ghazal in Southern Sudan

DNH Program Planning Exercise: Rural Development International

A Not Unusual Programming Story

The River

“Give Up a Gun and Get a Job”, A DNH Exercise

Case Study

MODULE II of a Do No Harm Workshop

Case Study

Beginning the Analysis by Focusing on an Assistance Programme in a Distant Setting

In most situations, the session of the workshop that immediately follows the Introduction will be a Case Study to get people thinking about the various relationships of outside assistance with internal conflict. Trainers should use a case from a place that most participants do not know. This is because such a case can get participants to grapple with issues without being threatened by what they may perceive as “outsider (trainers’) criticism” of their own circumstances. If you use a case that is familiar to many participants, they will spend most of their time discussing whether or not the case is “accurate.”

Pedagogical objectives

- 1 To encourage participants to analyze systematically the relationships between assistance and conflict;
- 2 To encourage participants to consider how assistance may have negative and positive impacts on conflict;
- 3 To set the tone for both challenging and inquiring discussion in which all ideas and experiences are valued while rigorous analysis is expected.

Introduction

To introduce this session, the trainer might note that we will move directly into a case study, based on assistance programming in another region of the world, as a way of using others’ experience to get into the discussion about the participants’ local situation.

In introducing the case, the trainer should indicate that people almost always criticize case studies as not having sufficient information. However, we answer this by noting: “That’s life!” In our kind of work, we always have too little information, but we also always have to make the best programming decisions we can based on whatever information we have. In this way, use of a case study is a way of simulating real circumstances and helping participants develop the skills to use information well and to identify clearly what else they need to know.

In addition, discussants will be surprised at how much information actually is in what appears to be a very short case. They should be advised to read it very carefully because there is more there than they may think.

The trainer should then hand out the case study and give an appropriate amount of time for participants to read it. Be sure to be clear about how much time they have. In some situations

Case Study

(where there is sufficient time and, especially, where people have difficulty with English), it is also useful to have people discuss the case in small groups before a plenary discussion.

It is always a good idea to give the participants some “study questions” to guide their reading of the case. These are suggested in the attached case studies and teaching notes.

CASE STUDY

Food For Work for Rebuilding War-Damaged Homes in Tajikistan

(Save the Children Federation)

Case Study

Food For Work for Rebuilding War-Damaged Homes in Tajikistan

Save the Children Federation

1. After the break-up of the Soviet Union, a struggle for leadership broke out in the former Soviet Republic of Tajikistan between communist factions and a coalition of anti-communist and Islamicist opposition groups. The result was an intense and bloody civil war that in early 1991 spread from the capital, Dushanbe, into rural areas and lasted until December of 1992. In the villages, the political content of the conflict was blurred so that it came to resemble an ethnic conflict between Kulyabi Tajiks, who supported the communist faction, and Garmi Tajiks, who were associated with the opposition. Kulyabis and Garmis are Tajik sub-groups that share the same religion, customs and language, a dialect of Farsi.
2. The worst of the fighting was concentrated in Khatlon Province, located in southwestern Tajikistan and bordering on Afghanistan. The area had been settled during the 1930's and 1940's when the Soviet government had forcibly relocated tens of thousands of Garmis and Kulyabis to the area to become workers in the newly created cotton-growing state farms. Typically, entire villages were relocated and, as a result, the region became a patchwork of mono-ethnic villages. However, over the years some villages merged and, by the outbreak of the civil war, about a quarter of the villages in the region were ethnically mixed. In the cities and towns, there was a high degree of inter-group marriage. Demonstrations of strong ethnic identification were rare in the daily lives of the people.
3. During the war, villages became targets of looting and burning by both sides. In late 1992, with the help of Russian troops still stationed in the area, the Kulyabi forces defeated the Garmi. Though damage had been moderate during the war, the victory was followed by a rampage of the Kulyabi militias during which Garmi houses and villages were systematically destroyed. Many men were killed, over 20,000 homes were severely damaged or destroyed, and many families fled for safety. In many Garmi villages, only the mosque was left standing.
4. Though open warfare ended in late 1992, the armed opposition remains active in northern Afghanistan and continues to stage cross-border raids from time to time. In addition, they control some mountainous sections of Tajikistan. Twenty-five thousand Russian troops remain in the country, helping keep open warfare from breaking out again. Even so, an atmosphere of relative lawlessness continues as bands of armed thugs (sometimes inter-ethnic in their composition) continue to loot villages and steal humanitarian relief supplies.
5. By fall 1994, Save the Children Federation (SCF) had a large and active programme underway in several districts of Khatlon Province. The programme provided food payments from Food for Work (FFW) to village-based brigades of local people in payment for their labor on the reconstruction of war-damaged homes. The project was successful in supporting the rebuilding of many homes and this, in turn, encouraged the rapid repatriation of people who had fled during the war. SCF staff felt that repatriation was an important first step in reconciliation, but they also wanted to find other opportunities to use their programme to promote inter-group linkages and reconciliation.

Case Study

6. Tajikistan was the poorest of the Soviet Republics. By decision of central Soviet authority, the economy was concentrated in cotton production and related enterprises (such as cotton milling, cotton seed production and garment making). The single-sector specialization meant that Tajikistan, like other Soviet Republics, depended heavily on trade for most goods. Most basic foodstuffs have been imported since the 1930's.
7. Cotton production fell throughout the 1980s. The war greatly worsened an already bad economic situation. Destruction of factories, equipment and the extensive network of irrigation canals essential for cotton production, coupled with an out-migration of many non-Tajik skilled technicians and managers, left the country's economy severely disrupted. The breakdown in trade left Tajikistan facing serious food shortages.
8. The cotton farming in Khatlon was organized in large state farms that held most of the province's best arable land and employed the majority of the working population. Each state farm included many villages without regard for their ethnic composition. Thus, Kulyabi and Garmi had worked side-by-side, men in positions of management and on canal maintenance and women in planting, cultivation and harvesting. Villages also shared schools, clinics and all the other social services of the Soviet system. In spite of occasional tensions and competition for leadership positions within the state farms, relations between groups were generally harmonious. As the war came to an end, the fields lay fallow awaiting the planting of a cotton crop on which virtually everyone in Khatlon Province depended for survival. The vast network of irrigation canals was disrupted, undermining any potential cotton crop and water access in villages as well.
9. Each household in Khatlon continues to own a small private plot on which they have always grown vegetables for household consumption and local sale.
10. In some cases, local people of Khatlon took "reconciliation initiatives" in the period of repatriation. For example, a woman officer of one district government knew her former Garmi neighbors were returning. She "prepared food for three days" and invited these returnees and her Kulyabi neighbors to dinner beneath her garden arbor. Facing each other across her table, they ate together in what she hoped was a reconciling way. In another village, when Garmi families returned, Kulyabi residents "went out to meet them with bread and salt," a traditional symbolic welcoming. Many people believed that "the common people don't want war, but policy people make it."
11. Many noted that women have a special role to play in overcoming animosity. As one woman said, "The nature of women is different. She can forget and forgive but man is a little bit animal. His blood is hot." Others outlined things women could do including: "training their children better not to hate" (Kulyabi woman); "teaching my children and grandchildren not to seek reprisals, not to keep remembering and not to 'play' war with 'them'" (Garmi woman); "working together on common projects with 'them'" (Kulyabi woman); "getting my husband who was a school teacher to meet with 'their' teachers to talk about how teachers from both groups can teach better attitudes in school" (Garmi woman); and "women must lead us" (Kulyabi man).
12. In some villages, elder women and men formed committees to help settle disputes over housing when a Garmi family would return to find that a Kulyabi family had moved into their former home. However, many people also put responsibility for peace-making

Case Study

somewhere else. They shrugged and said: "time is the best healer" or "it will never happen again because people don't want war" or "we have learned our lesson" or "they have learned their lesson."

13. At the beginning of the repatriation process, Save the Children Federation (SCF) identified two main problems in post-war Tajikistan--a shortage of food and a large number of damaged or destroyed homes. Although food security was less than optimal in Kulyabi villages, malnutrition was mainly found in the destroyed villages.
14. SCF's response was to set up village-based brigades whom they paid with Food for Work to rebuild and repair houses. Priority was given to those villages with the most extensive damage and all destroyed houses in a targeted village were eligible for reconstruction. All village residents--both men and women--who wished to work were eligible to join a brigade. SCF surveyed housing to set priorities for repair and entered into "contracts" with brigades to do the work. The brigades built houses in the traditional way using local mud to make bricks for walls, and SCF provided roofing materials (donated by UNHCR which supplied these as part of their mandated programme to repatriate refugees). Food earned by one person working in a brigade was sufficient to meet 80% of an average family's caloric requirements through the winter of 1994-95.
15. By the fall of 1994, the FFW programme was well established in several districts of Khatlon Province. With over 80 locally hired staff, the programme had been able to organize 15,000 people, mostly returning refugees, to build 12,000 houses. To ensure that they did not hire staff with ethnic prejudices, SCF instituted an interviewing arrangement whereby staff of several different ethnicities interviewed each prospective candidate. It was assumed that any ethnic slurs or biases would be noted by at least one of the interviewers. SCF was satisfied that they were enabling the faster and safer repatriation of refugees and IDPs to the area and that this was a prerequisite for reconciliation.

Teaching Note

Food For Work for Rebuilding War-Damaged Homes in Tajikistan, Save the Children Federation

Study Questions

1. What do you identify as the divisions and sources of tension in Khatlon Province?
2. What do you identify as the things in Khatlon Province that connect people to each other?
3. What do you think is the impact of the SCF programme on the factors that divide people or are sources of tension divisions and on the factors that connect people?

Optional:

1. What suggestions, if any, do you have for other ways that SCF could have designed its programme to have a better impact on the conflict?

Teaching Plan

The Case may be taught in five parts after an initial Opening.

Opening

To set the stage for the plenary discussion, the trainer might say: *“We are in Khatlon Province in southern Tajikistan and the civil war has recently ended. We are the staff of an international assistance agency and we have been providing housing reconstruction assistance in the post-war setting. Here we are in a staff meeting looking back to see how we have done. To be able to assess our impact, we need to look at what we know about how things were before we began to work here.*

“As we always must do when analyzing a situation, let’s start with the facts. What do we know about the situation in Khatlon Province before we started our programme?”

Part I of Case Discussion

As the trainer begins this introduction, s/he may write on the board or flip-chart, **“THE CONFLICT SETTING”** and, underneath this to the left write **“TENSIONS/DIVISIONS”** (see page 1 of “Options” book for board layout). Then s/he could say: *“Let’s start by looking at the tensions in the situation. What do we know about the tensions and things that divided people in southern Tajikistan?”*

The participants will offer a number of ideas about the tensions and divisions. These might include:

- Ideological differences/communist and “opposition”
- Change in the political system/struggle for leadership
- Failed economy/unemployment/destroyed infrastructure/competition for scarce goods and resources
- Two distinct groups/Garmi and Kulyabi
- Shortages of food
- Previous reliance on mono-culture
- Destruction (especially, but not exclusively, Garmi houses)
- Occupation of G. houses by K.
- Displacement/refugee experience
- Repatriation
- Groups lives in separate villages (3/4 of villages mono-ethnic)

Etc.

If participants have difficulty getting started, the trainer may prompt responses with questions such as: *“Were there any sources of tension before the war began? What tensions were prompted or increased by the war?”* To be sure that the group really thinks about these tensions, the trainer should give enough time, waiting a few minutes, asking: *“Any others?”*

For adequate analysis, the list should include at a **minimum**:

- issues of economic hardship
- experiences of the war
- the changing political system and struggle for new leadership
- the fact that there are two distinct groups
- the pattern of living separately in the 75% of villages.

Etc.

Getting this list should take about fifteen to twenty minutes.

Optional: Finding Patterns

When a good list has been generated, the trainer should step back and ask the group to consider it. The question might be: *“What do you see in these tensions? Any patterns? Any common features? Important differences?”* The point is to get participants to use their “observation” of facts to initiate analysis of the situation. If they can see patterns, or important differences, among elements in their list, they can use this additional understanding to help them design better assistance programmes.

The group might note that not many (if any) of the tensions are historically deep-seated (except the living in separate villages but this is, as we know, somewhat offset by the working together in state enterprises; and, in any case, village separation does not, in and of itself, cause or reflect tensions). They might note that many are a result of, rather than cause of, the war (reprisals, destruction of houses and of the economy in general, disagreements over housing and repatriation resulting from one group having left). This should take no more than five minutes.

Part II of the Case Discussion

The trainer should then note that there are factors in the in all war situations that also bind people together, that connect them. Writing a heading on the right of the board (“CONNECTORS”), the trainer should ask the group to identify these from the case study. The question might be: *“What kinds of things do you see that connected people in Khatlon Province before our programme?”*

The group might list:

- ¼ villages ethnically mixed; towns also
- experience working together in state enterprises
- lived in area/worked together a long time
- intermarriages
- same language
- religion
- culture
- schools, clinics, social services
- the experiences of war
- threats from gangs
- “don’t want war”
- self-appointed elders committees to settle housing disputes
- ideas for how to move away from war

Etc.

Again, the trainer should be sure that this list is a strong and complete one, relying on the full information of the case study. S/he should ensure sufficient time for people to be imaginative. Getting this list should take about fifteen minutes.

Optional: Finding Patterns

When the list is generated, again the trainer should ask people to reflect on it. *“What patterns, common elements, differences do you see? Are there differences between this list and the one of tensions? What might these be?”*

Within the Connectors list, participants could note that some things preceded the war while others are a result of it; that there is a notably long history of connectedness between the groups that fought in the war. In comparing the two lists, they might note that there are more items on one list than on the other; that the “connectors” have to do with “normal” life while the “tensions” are more dramatic but also more recent; that language and religion are important connectors; that the economic experiences which once bound people are almost entirely destroyed now; etc. This discussion may take five to ten minutes.

Part III of the Case Discussion

The trainer should now turn the group’s attention to the assistance programme of SCF. Writing “**Assistance Project**” or “**Project**” between the list of dividers and of connectors, s/he should note that it is into this context that SCF brought assistance. Also, noting that assistance programmes are multi-layered and involve many decisions, the trainer should get the group, quickly, to identify the elements of the assistance programme as described. Questions could follow the programming elements as follows:

- ***Why did SCF do this programme? What were its mandated goals?***

(Responses include: Reconstruction to encourage repatriation as a precondition for reconciliation)

- ***What did SCF provide?***

(organization to encourage rebuilding destroyed houses; Food for Work -FFW)

- ***Who did SCF define as the target group?***

(villagers with destroyed houses (mostly G); mostly returnees; about 15,000 people were helped; anyone who “wanted to work” who lived in the villages where the damage was)

- ***Who were SCF’s staff?***

(>80 local staff; interviewed in way to ensure no prejudice; some expat staff)

- ***How did SCF do this programme?***

(surveys by SCF to assess damage, contracts with villages, materials for building, village-based brigades)

This should take about ten minutes.

Then the trainer should step back from the board and ask the participants to *evaluate* the project by asking: “***What were the needs identified which SCF wanted to meet? How did the***

assistance project address these needs? What were the stated objectives of SCF's project? What did they achieve? Do you think that this is a successful project?"

Part IV of the Case Discussion

The Impact of Humanitarian and Development Assistance on Conflict

Then, the trainer should note that it is now time to consider whether and how the SCF programme affected what existed before it began.

S/he should ask the group:

⇒ *“What do you think the impacts of our (reminding the group that we are acting as if we are the SCF staff looking back) programme were?”*

Referring to the lists on the board, the trainer should encourage the group to analyze the project's impacts, noting participants' responses by **drawing arrows** from the column “Assistance” toward the left to “TENSIONS/DIVISIONS” and toward the right to “CONNECTORS.”

Questions might include:

⇒ *“Which dividers and tensions do you think the programme increased or worsened? How? Why? Did we reduce any divisions? How? Why? What connectors did we support? Did we miss any? Did we undermine any? How? Why?”*

In each case, the participants should be asked to cite the facts from the case that they use to support their analysis. That is, in this section of the discussion, people should be urged to explain their thinking rather than giving one-word or short answers.

Ideas that will come out include:

- The programme's target on rebuilding the most damaged houses favored the group who suffered the most destruction (i.e. Garmi over Kulyabi), thus possibly worsening intergroup tensions.
- Linking of the FFW programme to house reconstruction, and placing both of these in the villages (75% of which were mono-ethnic) meant that more Garmi than Kulyabi also were able to get employment and food.
- Since “anyone who wanted to work” could do so, families may have had more than one family member involved in brigades. Because every worker received about 80% of a family's food requirement, and since most would have been Garmi, Garmi families could have had surplus food when Kulyabi families still were experiencing food shortages. This could also increase and exacerbate intergroup tensions.
- If Garmi families shared the food, this could reduce intergroup tensions. If they sold it, this could either encourage intergroup trade (and reduce tensions and support connectors) or seem exploitative and reinforce tensions. If they hoarded the extra food, this could worsen tensions.

- Housing is a privately owned asset and, therefore, only one family at a time benefits. This puts people in competition with each other. If community-based buildings or other assets had been reconstructed, this might have reinforced connections. Some of these existed in terms of schools, clinics, irrigation ditches, etc.
- In civil wars, assistance programmes that concentrate on need might well focus on only one group. In this case, the most housing was destroyed and malnutrition was worst in Garmi villages.
- By encouraging repatriation, SCF's programme was essentially a peace-building programme. People have to return to the area, if they are to be able to think about a joint future.
- The self-appointed elders committees that resolved housing disputes could have been included in the programme in some way, thus reinforcing existing connectors. This also might have lessened tensions that arose from competition among people for having their houses rebuilt.

Etc.

The trainer may draw lines among the various ideas to show the relationships being highlighted by the discussion. ***The trainer should NOT record all the ideas being offered at this point.*** To do this would slow the discussion down and take a lot of time. The point here is to signal that we are using the information generated on the board (the facts) to do our thinking. Drawing lines will reinforce the importance of using real information to do analysis and to make judgments (rather than simply theorizing in general terms), but will not slow down the thinking process.

As a closing remark the trainer should **always** emphasize that SCF's decisions were professional and correct decisions on a general level (e.g. on targeting: organizations will never have sufficient resources to meet everyone's needs and have to make choices. Therefore, targeting the most severely affected population is a perfectly legitimate decision) - but put into context some of these decisions had negative impacts. The case demonstrates that a project which is successful on its own terms may inadvertently have side effects that exacerbate tensions and feed into violent conflict.

Part V of the Case Discussion

Optional:

If there is sufficient time, trainers may challenge participants to review SCF's project and come up with some programming options to deal with one (or several) of the negative impacts discovered in the previous session. The trainer could ask:

“How could SCF have avoided these negative impacts? How could they have encouraged positive impacts? What programming options can you identify for SCF that would have been better?”

Again, the trainer must push the participants to justify their ideas from the facts they have (not ideas from the sky!).

Ideas may include:

- Rebuilding jointly held assets (irrigation, clinics, schools)
- Concentrating in mixed villages; learning from them how to ensure mixed brigades
- Paying in cash rather than food in order to ensure a greater market multiplier effect benefitting people in the area more broadly
- Involving the elders committees or mosques in deciding priorities

etc.

For each option suggested, the trainer should ask the group to consider whether it may have some other adverse, or positive, impact as well. Again, using facts to support analysis is what the trainer is pushing the group to do.

The options discussion may take from five to twenty minutes, depending on timing of the workshop.

Case Closing

The trainer should be sure to close the case by summarizing a few key points of the discussion. Essential to closing are the following:

1. Noting that all assistance may have negative and positive impacts on conflict even while it is doing a good job under its mandate (which the SCF programme clearly did do by building so many destroyed houses).
2. Noting that it is never an entire project that has a negative impact. It is always individual elements, individual decisions taken in the course of project planning and implementation. Therefore: “assistance” must be unpackaged, disaggregated in order to understand the interaction of assistance projects with conflict.
3. Noting that recognition of this fact allows us, as project planners, to predict where impacts might be negative and think of options to avoid this and to predict where divisions may be lessened or connectors be supported.

It is always good, at the end of a case, to congratulate the participants on their energy, ideas and analysis.

CASE STUDY

Assisting Displaced People From Bahr el Ghazal in Southern Sudan

Case Study

Assisting Displaced People From Bahr el Ghazal in Southern Sudan

1. Sudan has been the site of an intense civil war for over forty years. Though the entire country has been affected by the conflict, open fighting has been concentrated in the South.
2. The war in Sudan has been characterized as a conflict between the Muslim North and the Christian and animist South, with the government in the North attempting to impose its culture and system on the people in the South. However, recent shifts in the alliances of fighters from one side to the other call this characterization into question. In addition, divisions among fighters in the South have often led to battles with resultant inter-ethnic tensions between Southern groups.
3. There are many tribal/ethnic groups in Southern Sudan. Although there have always been some inter-group disputes, relations among them have varied from cordial (involving frequent inter-marriage and agreements among chiefs) to tense (characterized by cattle raids and intermittent fighting). The years of war have put additional strains on traditional patterns, sometimes forcing new alliances and sometimes erupting into new clashes. All areas of the South have suffered economically.
4. In May 1998, between 800 and 2000 Dinka people from various parts of Bahr el Ghazal walked south to Nadiangere in Yambio County in search of food. Due to fighting and two years of drought, Bahr el Ghazal was experiencing a pre-famine situation while food security in Yambio was relatively stable. Throughout 1998, international humanitarian assistance had focused on the Bahr el Ghazal region but had not been sufficient so there had been some hunger-related deaths.
5. The migration of Dinka into Yambio was very unusual. The Dinka are a Nilotic tribe whereas the vast majority of people in Yambio are Zande (a Bantu tribe). Three or four other smaller tribes constitute the rest of the population of Yambio.
6. The Dinka are agro-pastoralists and the Zande are agriculturalists. Because Yambio country is infested with tsetse fly, the Dinka cannot bring their cattle into the area.
7. The Dinka and Zande also differ culturally. For example, the Dinka have a strong sharing tradition that allows anyone who needs something to take it. When someone arrives hungry in a Dinka household, he or she may always eat from the family pot of food. When they migrated, Dinka often continued their sharing tradition, taking things that they needed even though other groups did not accept this tradition.
8. Dinka and Zande traditionally engaged in trade, exchanging Dinka meat for Zande grain or for cash. Some other contacts between the groups were violent. The last visit of the Dinka into Yambio had occurred in 1987/88 and was accompanied by raids and fighting.
9. Some of the Dinka cited reasons other than the famine conditions for their migration, including: 1) that though food was available in Bahr el Ghazal, its distribution was poorly organized; 2) that the food that was available was being sold by authorities; or 3) that authorities had given instructions that they should move south.
10. Some members of the local Zande community did not believe the migrants' explanations for their arrival and suspected, instead, that they were Dinka soldiers in disguise, or they were criminals or some other kind of outcasts. Some Zande were anxious, also, because they believed that the Dinka were capable of witchcraft, especially for rainmaking. This

Case Study

challenged their strong Christian beliefs. One local resident suspected that the Dinka had begun to eat their own children during the long walk to Yambio.

11. In spite of everything, the Dinka who arrived in Yambio in dire need were received by the local peoples with hospitality. They shared food, space, shelter and cooking facilities with the new arrivals. They explained this saying, "They are human beings who need to survive just like us."
12. One local chief remembered his own ancestor's displacement that had brought them to Yambio years ago. There was a general sense among the Yambio groups that they shared the Dinka's uncertainty, food insecurity and displacement as a result of the war (though at a different level).
13. Some local people hired Dinka men and women to do agricultural work, paying them either with food or money. When they worked together, both men and women seemed to connect easily across groups. However, Dinka chiefs made no direct attempt to interact with local chiefs. Dinkas who were Christians attended Sunday services in local churches despite the language barrier between the groups.
14. The influx of Dinka into Yambio County put a strain on food security and on potable water in the region. The displaced Dinka also lacked most essential household items, seeds and tools.
15. Though they sympathized with the Dinkas' plight, local people and their authorities did not want them to settle in their area.
16. NGOs made a rapid assessment of the situation in Yambio. They found 25 moderately or severely malnourished Dinka children in need of supplementary feeding and medical assistance and identified food assistance as being urgently needed by the whole Dinka group.
17. Although the NGOs felt that it would be best for the Dinka to return to their homes, they refused to do so even when promised assistance at their place of origin.
18. The NGOs were unsure how long to continue to provide assistance to the displaced Dinkas in Yambio County. The local community was advising them to supply seeds and tools to Dinkas as well as food so that they could reestablish their own food security. If they planted crops, it would take two months until the Dinka could realize their first harvest. The local community also wanted to receive non-food aid if such was distributed to the displaced Dinka.
19. Faced with the desire of local people that the Dinka should leave and with the Dinka refusal to return to Bahr el Ghazal, NGOs considered relocating the Dinkas to Menze, a scarcely populated area 18 km to the north of Nadiangere. The people of Menze objected to this, but their chief seemed willing to welcome the Dinka.
20. As the NGOs were considering their options, word came of another influx of displaced Dinka moving from Bahr el Ghazal into the Menze area.

Teaching Note

Assisting Displaced People From Bahr el Ghazal in Southern Sudan

Study Questions

1. What do you identify as the divisions and sources of tensions between the displaced Dinka people and the people in the Yambio county area where they immigrated?
2. What do you identify as the things that connect them?
3. How would you provide emergency aid in this setting?
4. Would you provide longer-term assistance? If so, what would you do and why? If not, why not and what would be the likely outcomes of your decision?

Teaching Plan

The Case may be taught in three parts after the Opening

Opening

To start the discussion, the trainer should note that we are facing an emergency, with displaced people arriving in our area and some of them are clearly in need of food. *“We need to respond in an appropriate way. Yet we know the area is one affected by war, and we know that these influences need to be factored into our assistance approaches.”*

“To think about how to provide appropriate assistance, then, let’s analyze the situation and see how that might influence our decisions.”

“Let’s start by looking at the facts of the situation.”

Part I of the Case Discussion

As the trainer begins this introduction, s/he may write on the board, **“CONTEXT OF CONFLICT”** and to the left write **“TENSIONS/DIVISIONS”**. S/he could then ask: *“What do you identify as the sources of tensions between the new arrivals in Yambio county and the people who lived there? What things divide them?”*

Participants will offer a number of ideas like:

- Different ethnic groups
- Different cultures
- Different language
- Raids in the past/violence

- Different economic activities: the Dinka are agro-pastoralists with cattle while the Zande are agriculturalists
- Suspicion/"eating children"
- Suspicion: Why are they here? Are they spies?
- Ongoing war/sides
- Tsetse fly kept them apart
- Food insecurity
- Dinka tradition of sharing

Etc.

The trainer should be sure that the group generates a good and complete list and that they come to some agreement on these issues.

When a list is complete, the trainer should ask the group to consider which of these seem to be of greatest importance in terms of the likelihood for intergroup violence. This discussion could take five minutes and people will have different opinions. There is no need for the group to agree on this at this point.

Part II of the Case Discussion

The trainer should then ask: *“What things do you identify that connect the two groups in the region?”* S/he should write **“CONNECTORS”** on the board to the right.

The list that the participants come up with will include such things as:

- Suffering from war
- Christians in both groups
- Working together
- Hospitality traditions
- Zande think of Dinka as “humans just like us”
- Trade
- Hiring
- History of migration
- Worked easily together

Etc.

Part III of the Case Discussion

In this part of the discussion, the trainer will invite the group to consider programming options and opportunities and to assess the ways in which different approaches interact with the Divisions/Tensions and with the Connectors.

To begin, the trainer should note that the NGOs assessment is that people need food to survive. Noting this, s/he should write on a separate board **“NEED: FOOD”**.

Then, pointing out that assistance programs have many elements, s/he should write **“Assistance”** in the center of the board (see layout) and under it write:

- Whether/Why
- When/For How Long
- Where
- What
- For Whom (beneficiaries?)
- Staff
- How

As s/he writes these, the trainer should note that assistance agencies make many decisions as they put together an assistance programme. These decisions involve whether and why to provide assistance; where to provide it; when and for how long; what to provide; who should benefit; how to staff the programme; and finally, how to get the things they are going to provide to the people they decide to help.

The trainer should then assign the group to plan an assistance programme that takes account of the settings as we have described it on the board (under DIVISIONS/TENSIONS AND CONNECTORS). They should decide what is needed and how to provide it.

This could be done in small groups, or ten minutes could be provided to the group to divide up into team of two, each turning to a person sitting next to him/her, to do this programming.

Discussion

After the groups have worked on this assignment, the trainer should lead a discussion that prompts the group consider the implications of each of their programming decisions. To do this, the trainer should invite one group to describe their assistance plan.

The trainer should record the ideas under the headings above having to do with WHY, WHERE, WHAT, FOR WHOM, STAFF, HOW, etc. When the group has laid out their ideas, the trainer should then ask all the participants to consider the impacts of this assistance programme on the groups.

To do this, s/he could begin by asking:

“How do you think this plan will affect the divisions between the groups and/or the tensions that divide them?”

When someone gives an answer, the trainer should always ask ***“Why do you think that?”*** The point would be to help people consider carefully how each choice may affect the various divisions and tensions they have identified.

The trainer should constantly refer back to the list of DIVISIONS and tensions. S/he could ask such things as ***“How would your decision to do that affect this division the group identified?”***

When divisions and tensions have been considered, the trainer should also ask ***“What do you think will be the effect of your plan on the connectors?”***

Again each answer should be explored and discussed by the whole group.

After one group has made its presentation, the trainer should encourage the other groups to put in the ideas they had for ways to reduce tensions and reinforce connectors.

If time permits, the trainer could ask the group to think of other programming options to correct problems that have been identified through this discussion.

Closing

When the group has systematically discussed the effects of their programming ideas on both divisions/tensions and connectors, the trainer could close by reminding the group that it is important to plan assistance in ways that achieve three goals. These are:

1. to meet needs
2. not to worsen intergroup tensions
3. to reinforce the connectors between.

The rest of the workshop will deal with each of these issues in turn.

The trainer should compliment the group on its good work and thinking. S/he should point out that we are adding new criteria for the judgment of effective assistance and that this requires that we consider the side-effects of our programs on the conflicts that exist in the areas where we give assistance. This case has introduced these ideas. Now we will turn to a thorough examination of all aspects of these issues.

DNH Program Planning Exercise

Rural Development International

By Marc Michaelson

Trainer's Notes

Goals:

- 1) To practice applying DNH/LCP concepts in specific program planning scenarios.
- 2) To show the time pressures, competing interests, and fluidity of conflict situations and provide participants with a chance to discuss these complexities (and strategies for coping with them).
- 3) To spur creative thinking for programming in conflict-prone areas

Time:

This exercise should take about 1 1/2 hours to complete.

Exercise:

- 1) Introduce the exercise as a fictional scenario based on real world situations. Break the group into small groups of 3-4 persons each. They should stay in the main room, but work in individual clusters around the room.

As background, explain to the participants:

“You are a team of Program Managers for Rural Development International (RDI), an NGO which employs an integrated approach to rural development. The agency chooses a target area and then seeks to assist the local population with a comprehensive set of interventions and services. After conducting a national assessment, RDI has decided to launch a new program in much-neglected Region 18 of the country. The area has received little external or government aid—in part because of occasional outbreaks of violence. However, over the past two years, security has greatly improved, and RDI sees this to be an opportune time to begin assisting the local population with their serious development needs. RDI will be the first major NGO to work in Region 18.”

“Your task is to use the attached briefing report and map (Attachment 2) to put together a program strategy. You will need to decide who you will consult, what interventions to start with, where you will work, who you will work with (and why). These questions are found on Attachment 1. You will have a half hour to discuss and map out your strategy.”

Emphasize that this exercise is an opportunity to grapple with program planning and management, while maintaining an “LCP” lens throughout the process:

“Keep in mind both local “needs” and conflict-related considerations. You want to accomplish your program goals and at the same time ensure that your aid “Does No Harm” and if possible supports “Local Capacities for Peace.” “

2) Give the teams about 15 minutes to work on the program strategizing. Then, interrupt their process with “New Information”. Read it and then pass it out to each group. The handout reads:

“A skirmish has broken out at Water Point A (refer to map), between two smaller sub-groups of Mandabi and Kora. The Elder’s Committee was quickly mobilized, and stepped in to mediate the dispute with the support of the Regional Government authorities. The fighting has stopped, but several people were injured and the situation on the ground remains tense. Meanwhile, a local “bandit,” whose group of renegade youths is said to have perpetrated several armed robberies along the highway has requested a meeting with you. He has heard rumors that RDI plans to build wells in the area and he has some ‘strong suggestions’ for where the wells should be put.”

How do you respond to this new information?

- 1) How do you deal with the news of the latest Mandabi-Kora skirmish? Does it impact your program strategizing in any way? If so, how?
 - 2) As for the “bandit,” how do you deal with his request for a meeting?
-
-

3) Give the groups another 10 minutes to grapple with the problems raised above. Then, interrupt them once more and read “New Information #2”:

“The skirmish at “Water Point A” turns out to have been an early indicator of a serious drought in the area. Local people are “on the move” in search of water and food. The Mandabi areas are worst-affected, but the situation in the eastern Kora settlements and border areas are also extremely serious. An emergency meeting of donors and government authorities in the nation’s capital resolved to designate 30,000 metric tons of food aid to Region 18. As the only NGO with field-level knowledge of the area, the donors have approached RDI to organize the food distribution program.”

How do you respond to this new information?

- 1) Will RDI take on this emergency food distribution program? If so, how will you organize it? Initially, you only have enough staff and resources to set up two distribution sites—where will you put them? How will you select the targets (beneficiaries)?
 - 2) How will these new developments affect your longer-term programs? Can you devise any creative ways to link the short-term emergency program to the longer-term development programs?
-

4) After 10 more minutes, bring the group work to a close. Reconvene in a plenary (45 minutes) to discuss the exercise. Focus discussion on two major themes.

First, let the groups share their experiences. How did they feel during the exercise? What did they experience as they tried to cope with changing circumstances? (some of the following issues may be raised—time pressures, fluidity of conflict situations, unpredictability/change inherent in our work).

Second, have the groups share some of their plans (for each of the three sections of the exercise). What did they decide for their initial program strategy? How did they anticipate their program would affect the conflict between the Kora and Mandabis. Put another way, how did they intend to ensure that their program would “Do No Harm” or support “Local Capacities for Peace.”

For the second section—did they meet with the “bandit” or not? How did they deal with that problem.

And for the third section, ask if any groups were able to devise any creative solutions for responding to the food emergency in a way that reduced tensions/dividers and reinforced connectors and LCPs.

Wrap-Up - Conclude the session with a few observations from the group work and compliments on the hard work and insightfulness that came out through their team work. Mention also that while this exercise used a fictional scenario (albeit one based on several real cases), that such complexities and dilemmas face us every day as we make important program management decisions. LCP is an additional lens that helps us to be aware of the conflict implications of our work. And that we can use these LCP tools in our own program areas.

Rural Development International (RDI)
Region 18 -- Briefing Report

- 1) Region 18 is an extremely dry area inhabited primarily by two ethnic groups—the Kora and the Mandabi. Population figures from the last census (1971) are unreliable, but the breakdown is believed to be about 65% Mandabi, 30% Kora and 5% highland settlers (nearly all of whom live in the regional capital). A general map showing territories and settlement patterns is attached.
- 2) Both the Kora and Mandabi are traditionally pastoralists. Both groups raise camels, sheep and goats primarily for subsistence, but some are brought to local markets for sale. In addition, the Mandabi are well-known cattle-herders.
- 3) Both groups traditionally own some land, but they move seasonally for watering and grazing, sometimes into each other's territories. Most Kora and Mandabi live separately, in adjacent lands, but there are two small settlement pockets in the boundary areas (and the regional capital) where the two groups live intermingled. The major road of Region 18 also represents the general dividing line between the two population's territories.
- 4) The Mandabi areas are drier, deforested and more marginalized than the less-drought prone and relatively more fertile Kora lands. Many Kora who live in the vicinity of the River (which is actually a dry riverbed for 9 months of the year) have begun small-scale farming using very basic, metal hand implements. Animal traction has never been attempted, but appears to be technically feasible.
- 5) Both groups are Muslim and share several cultural similarities. Elders are respected in Kora and Mandabi tradition, and they are responsible for upholding traditional laws and resolving disputes. The two ethnic groups speak different languages, but some members of each speak Arabic. Inter-marriage between the two groups is rare.
- 6) Despite very rare disputes, the two groups lived peacefully until 1951. In that year, due to serious drought, the Mandabi began to push the Kora from their traditional grazing lands. A few violent battles broke out between families living in the boundary areas. Thirty-five Koras and 12 Mandabis were killed in the fighting that year. The Koras withdrew from some of their lands, but vowed revenge.
- 7) After more small skirmishes, in 1986 another major battle broke out and hundreds were killed on both sides. The national government looked the other way as the fighting occurred and did nothing to restore peace. Throughout the 1990s tit-for-tat blood feuds continued—families on both sides sought revenge for past killings and looted land and livestock from each other. Also during this time, a few groups of bandits formed to take advantage of the relative lawlessness. These bandits are frustrated, unemployed youth—mostly but not exclusively Mandabi. They have used cheaply-purchased guns to rob cars and trucks on the main road.
- 8) Recently, the situation has improved. Early in 1998, a new government came to power in the capital, and has begun to decentralize power to the Regions. The new Governor of Region 18 is Mandabi and the Deputy is Kora. They have begun to establish an ethnically-balanced

administration, and vowed to bring an end to the Kora-Mandabi fighting. As a start, they have assembled a committee of elders to discuss issues of peace-making.

9) RDI Program staff recently visited the area to assess program potentials. Residents complained of drought and lack of food. The staff reported back that water is the most pressing need and secondly food security (pastoral and agricultural support). They found the two existing boreholes (Water Points A and B on the map) to be reliable but woefully insufficient to meet regional needs. The areas around the boreholes are completely deforested from overgrazing. Education and health care were also raised as serious concerns since there are no schools or health centers in the area.

10) From this initial survey, the previous RDI Program Manager drafted a proposal and budget for Years 1 and 2 that has been approved for funding by the European Union. Just before your arrival in country, a Water Point (borehole) feasibility study was conducted by technical experts, the results of which are shown on the map.

11) Year 1 funding is sufficient to set up the RDI program sub-office in Region 18, hire staff, conduct more detailed needs assessments and construct two water points. Budgeted interventions for Year 2 include the construction of 1 primary school and 1 health center.

Attachment 1 — Program Strategy Development

Use the briefing report and map (Attachment 2) to put together a program strategy. Use both your “development” lens and your new “conflict” lens when thinking about your program.

- 1) Where will you set up the RDI program sub-office for Region 18, and how will you select staff?
- 2) Who will you consult with during the program planning process and needs assessments?
- 3) How will you decide where to construct the two water points in Year 1? Mark on the map where you will put them and why?
- 4) Where will you build the primary school and health clinics during Year 2? Why?

New Information

“A skirmish has broken out at Water Point A (refer to map), between two smaller sub-groups of Mandabi and Kora. The Elder’s Committee was quickly mobilized, and stepped in to mediate the dispute with the support of the Regional Government authorities. The fighting has stopped, but several people were injured and the situation on the ground remains tense. Meanwhile, a local “bandit,” whose group of renegade youths is said to have perpetrated several armed robberies along the highway has requested a meeting with you. He has heard rumors that RDI plans to build wells in the area and he has some ‘strong suggestions’ for where the wells should be put.”

How do you respond to this new information?

- 1) How do you deal with the news of the latest Mandabi-Kora skirmish? Does it impact your program strategizing in any way? If so, how?
- 2) As for the “bandit,” how do you deal with his request for a meeting?

New Information #2

“The skirmish at “Water Point A” turns out to have been an early indicator of a serious drought in the area. Local people are “on the move” in search of water and food. The Mandabi areas are worst-affected, but the situation in the eastern Kora settlements and border areas are also extremely serious. An emergency meeting of donors and government authorities in the nation’s capital resolved to designate 30,000 metric tons of food aid to Region 18. As the only NGO with field-level knowledge of the area, the donors have approached RDI to organize the food distribution program.”

How do you respond to this new information?

- 1) Will RDI take on this emergency food distribution program? If so, how will you organize it? Initially, you only have enough staff and resources to set up two distribution sites—where will you put them? How will you select the targets (beneficiaries)?
- 2) How will these new developments affect your longer-term programs? Can you devise any creative ways to link the short-term emergency program to the longer-term development programs?

Case Study

A Not Unusual Programming Story

A Not Unusual Programming Story

An NGO Enters a Context and Begins a Programme

The country is being torn by a civil war. To ensure that all parts of the country are reached by assistance, international NGOs have each taken responsibility for a specific area.

An international NGO has found itself in a position to provide food to a sizable number of vulnerable people in an active war zone. But because the intensity of the war varies across the country, the agency has decided to link its feeding programmes to seeds and tools assistance to encourage areas where there was no fighting to adopt strategies for food self sufficiency.

To integrate its food aid and agricultural support programmes, the aid agency hired its first in-country staff through the agricultural colleges in the region. The international staff felt fortunate to find these specialists with the appropriate skills for the work. These individuals were in charge of establishing relations with recipient villages.

This NGO operates on a partnering principle. Working with local NGOs would, they knew, increase the sustainability of their activities when they left and, in the meantime, give them a close connection to the villages where they worked. They do not know, however, if there are responsible local NGOs in their area.

The Region

The region where this particular agency worked was populated mostly by one ethnic group who were Christian. Another, smaller ethnic group, primarily Muslim, had also lived in the area for many years. However, some of this group had fled during the war because they were aligned with an opposing militia in the fighting.

Prior to the war, the two groups had lived side by side. The dominant group were farmers; some of the second group, because they had difficulties establishing rights to land ownership, were traders transporting the agricultural produce of the first group to markets where they could get good prices.

Land tenure had always been a somewhat touchy issue between the two groups in that ownership usually derived through usership, and decisions about land use were made by chiefs who, more often than not, represented the majority population group.

Over Time

Over time, both the food aid and agriculture programmes expanded. The NGO hired additional staff, most from the area where they had programmes, relying again on the Ag colleges and on "word of mouth". Often, the local staff recruited people when jobs needed to be filled.

Also, over time, local partners were found to assist in the programming. The local partners began to propose new initiatives as well. Among these initiatives were suggestions about micro-finance, in particular to assist farmers in getting their surpluses to market.

Case Study

The River

The River

1. An international NGO has been working for some time in the area of The River where there have been ongoing conflicts or “tribal clashes” between several different groups with a rough division between agriculturalist and pastoralist lifestyles. The area is drought-prone, and clashes between the two groups become more severe when water is scarce. However, even during drought there is usually enough water in the river for everyone, so resource scarcity is not a significant flashpoint in this instance
2. The pastoralist peoples herd cattle and other livestock and range widely through the area without great regard for the settlement of land. The agriculturalist peoples raise cereals and vegetables, and some have also taken to rearing livestock in a small way. The agricultural communities live in mono-ethnic clusters close to the river while the pastoralists live further in the hinterland.
3. The normal migration pattern for the pastoral population means moving towards the river during dry season and back to the hinterland during the rainy season.
4. Much of the river bank areas consist of small agricultural plots used by the various farming communities. Access to the river for livestock to drink, therefore, often involves pastoralists and their herds traversing land which the agriculturalists consider theirs (and to which they may at times even hold legal title). As might be expected, the cattle trample and graze on the crops as they pass, which enflames resentments by the farmers.
5. Also, in keeping with the pastoralist mentality which does not readily accept ownership of land (land is seen as common property for grazing), the pastoralists often allow their cattle to graze on the crops of the agriculturalists. In addition, various types of raiding are prevalent: inter-pastoralist raids for cattle, pastoralist against agriculturalist, and particularly pastoralist against members of the agriculturalist community who have recently taken to rearing cattle “against type”.
6. In times of plenty, but even on occasion when things are difficult, casual encounters on the banks of the river between members of different communities seeking water for their different needs have been a significant factor for cohesion in the area for a long time. Such encounters give people the chance to exchange pleasantries, indulge in gossip or even petty trade.
7. The River has been identified as both a divider and a connector in this context. How?

Analysis

1. This example demonstrates two connected points: first, that whereas it may seem that “the river” represents both a connector and a divider, careful further analysis reveals that different aspects of the same larger phenomenon are individually a connector (meetings by the river) and a divider (access to the river).
2. Second, by using such analysis to carefully distinguish between the two aspects of “the river” - one positive and one negative - we open up the possibility that aid agencies could more carefully orient their actions to reinforce the connector and diminish the source of division.
3. Programme options discussed included the idea that the agency might develop cattle troughs or water points near pastoral communities in the hinterland, at a distance from the agricultural plots, thus reducing livestock migrating to the river for water and correspondingly reducing conflict. But though this would lessen the tension side of the river issue (avoiding cattle trampling and grazing crops) it would weaken the connector side (casual encounters at the river’s edge would lessen).
4. A better option from a Do No Harm perspective, therefore, was the suggestion to negotiate specific and agreed access corridors to the river that would be acceptable to both sides.

A DNH Exercise

“Give Up a Gun and Get a Job”

"Give Up a Gun and Get a Job", A DNH Exercise

The Scenario

A donor offers funding for a particular project:

Help the process of disarmament and demobilization by hiring ex-combatants to collect garbage in the capital city.

We'll call it "Give up a gun and get a job".

Our agency responds with some questions about the effectiveness of this project. We are not sure the ex-combatants will take the jobs.

But the donor responds: *We all have to do things we don't like to do.*

The Exercise

Using the Do No Harm Framework, do a more substantive analysis of potential issues and think about how you will raise them with the donor.

Begin by outlining the details of the project. Then think seriously about the potential impacts using the categories of Resource Transfers and Implicit Ethical Messages. Highlight the five that you think are most important.

Analyzing the Details of the Project

This is a quick list of what we know about the project, including some additional commentary and questions.

Why this project? What is the goal?

- Disarmament and demobilization.
- But beyond that, the goal is increasing the security of the country.

We need to ask: is this the best way to increase security? (Using RPP criteria: is this project big enough, fast enough, and sustainable and is it linked to projects working at other levels?)

What will be provided in this project?

- Jobs and the funding to pay salaries.
- There are possibly other resources included in the project. For example: training, trucks, uniforms, tools (rakes, big plastic bags), petrol, or even the ability to move from neighborhood to neighborhood.

Any new jobs have to be attractive to the people we are trying to recruit. In this case, are the jobs available more attractive than keeping the guns?

We need to consider how the salary will compare to those of comparable jobs. We may need to offer higher wages in order to attract people into the project (for some ramifications of this, see "Market Effects" below).

Who are the beneficiaries? With whom do we work?

- Ex-combatants who still have guns.

Do we utilize any other criteria for the selection of participants? Do we accept any ex-combatant? Where do we find these ex-combatants? How do we inform them of this possible job opportunity?

Where is the project located?

- In the capital city.

Do we move ex-combatants to the city to provide them with the jobs? Do we help them find places to live? Do we let them bring their families?

Are some neighborhoods of the city more affected by this project than others, either in terms of where garbage will be collected (which neighborhoods benefit?) or where garbage will be dumped?

How long is the funding for the project? When will the project end?

What happens to garbage collection when the funding runs out? When will jobs collecting garbage be open to anybody who applies and not just ex-combatants?

How is the project to be implemented?

- Through collection of garbage.

Is this job actually attractive? To whom? Will the garbage collection teams work with neighborhood committees?

Resource Transfers

Theft

Given the lack of direct information about this project, it is difficult to consider how theft might impact the project and community. However, there are two sets of issues that we might, in general, want to consider even without further information:

- We should look more closely at the resources we intend to provide in this project. How valuable are they? How vulnerable to theft will they be? How will we structure the supervision of these resources? What will our response to theft be?
- Garbage collection in some countries is a place where criminal gangs can establish themselves in order to launder money and gain access to government officials.

Market Effects

The first question to ask in such a situation, where employment in a specific area is being proposed, is always: who currently does the job in question? What will be the impact on these people if we begin this project?

If our project is going to take the full responsibility for garbage collection away from the municipality, then it seems these city employees who currently collect garbage will lose their jobs. In such a case, obviously, the project has little to no impact on creating new employment. The impact on resentment, however, will likely be considerable. The newly unemployed will rightly be unhappy with our NGO, but they will also likely bear some animosity for the municipality that allowed this injustice to occur, while also resenting the new workers. It is this last which should concern us most when thinking about the potential conflict implications of the project.

We should also consider that in many immediately post-conflict situations, NGOs can often offer salaries much higher than governments, particularly those of municipalities. Higher wages for the new workers could make these jobs desirable, and lead to competition for them, while also rubbing salt in the wounds of the newly unemployed and/or the ineligible.

Another group to consider are unemployed individuals who might also want such jobs. If they are shut out of the opportunity for this job, at whatever salary, they may well bear some resentment toward the NGO or the ex-combatants.

We must also consider the duration of the funding. A short-term project will throw open the jobs in a relatively short time, reawakening competition, and stifling the ability of the people involved in the project or the municipality to plan for the long-term. What, after all, will happen to the garbage (and its collection) once the funding runs out?

If we are planning on moving the ex-combatants to the capital city, we need to consider the impact this is likely to have on things such as rents. How many people will we be bringing into the city? The ex-combatants are very likely to bring their families, and that will naturally increase the number of people having an impact on the city and its services.

Finally, there might be perverse effects to this project, with people going out and getting guns so as to try to get a job. This will certainly have an impact on the price of guns in the city, and possibly their availability.

Distributional Effects

Providing jobs to those who have participated in the violence, while leaving out of the project those who did not participate, seems to emphasize that those who have been involved in the fighting are worthy of special consideration. Simply: guys with guns are getting jobs, while those without are not.

It is not clear whether this distributional aspect of the project will lead to conflict. As one of the groups is characterized by being an active part of the conflict, while the other is notable because they have not been active in the conflict, it seems unlikely that distributing jobs to the more violent group will provoke the other to actual violence. However, a message will be sent because we have chosen to recognize that the violent deserve our concern in this particular fashion, while the non-violent get – from us, at this moment, through this project – comparatively little.

(See also, "*Different Value for Different Lives*".)

Substitution Effects

Our NGO is being asked to take on a job that rightly belongs under the mandate of the municipality. This has the potential to remove consideration of sanitation and garbage collection from the concern of the municipality and it may be difficult in the future to get the municipality to take up the responsibility.

Another consideration we should take into account is the duration of this project's funding. In the case of a short-term project, the municipality may be better able to adjust itself to taking up this particular burden, as it will not have been long removed from their mandate. However, the municipality may not be able to allocate appropriate funds if the project is over too quickly. The demobilized soldiers may find themselves back on the streets with even fewer prospects than before. If the project is a long-term one, then we run the risk of allowing (or even encouraging) the municipality to forget that the trash is, in fact, their responsibility.

Legitimization Effects

There are two potential aspects of the legitimization effect at work in this project. First, as an NGO takes over responsibility for garbage collection from the municipality, the legitimacy of the municipality authority could be weakened. The citizens may cease to respect those areas where the municipality retains its authority, such as with the police or traffic laws.

Second, by providing jobs to men who have quite possibly committed violence and human rights abuses, we may well legitimize the violence they committed. This will be a factor only if the jobs are not seen simply as "dirty work", and so might well depend on the salary structure, as well as the perks of the office.

(See also "*Arms and Power*" and "*Impunity*".)

Implicit Ethical Messages

Arms and Power

It is possible that one of the messages sent by this project could be simply that the guys who have the guns also get the jobs. One group that might read that message who would be disturbed by it would have to be ex-combatants who have already turned in their weapons and who never received such compensation. Why, these "good" citizens might ask, are the "bad" citizens getting preferential treatment? It is a good question.

Another power relationship implicit in the donor's stance is that those with the money get to dictate the terms under which it will be spent. A sort of "dollars and power" IEM.

Disrespect, Mistrust, Competition

The most obvious aspect of this is the attitude of the donor to the NGO, dismissing the NGO's concerns out of hand with a rather flip comment. The donor is simply treating the NGO as a conduit for the project, and does not appear to value our experience and our input. However, this exercise should provide us with some talking points in order to regain our self-respect and perhaps that of the folks at our donor.

If we were to carry out this project as proposed, we would be guilty of much the same behavior as the donor. We would be forcing the ex-combatants into a corner where they could either take *this* job or *no* job. We would be assuming that they have no options and will be glad for whatever hand-out we offer. Such a stance would be forgetting precisely why we are targeting these men in the first place: they have guns and, therefore, do have options – of an unpleasant and violent kind.

We should also be aware that garbage collection is, in many cultures, considered a "low" form of work, unskilled and distasteful. The people who perform it are often not considered worthy of much respect. This lack of respect would prove to be a change for these ex-combatants, men we are addressing through this project precisely because they have power of a kind. This change in status could lead to a host of issues and potentially violent outbursts.

Further, this lack of respect on our part could lead ex-combatants to look to another NGO for better prospects. If such a project exists, we should be prepared to note both our own reaction (negative?) and the donor's? Will the donor blame us for faulty implementation?

Impunity

If our NGO does hire ex-combatants, then it is important to use some additional criteria for selecting precisely which ex-combatants we will hire. If our hiring is indiscriminate, then we may hire ex-soldiers who were involved in the abuse of human rights. Giving them jobs with no questions asked is, in effect, giving them impunity for their actions.

Different Value for Different Lives

One of the most disturbing elements of this project is that it seems punitive. By insisting on garbage collection, the donor appears to want to punish the ex-combatants through potentially low status jobs. The project treats the ex-combatants as though they do not deserve any other type of job; they're only good enough for "dirty work". On the one hand, this sends a negative message about the desirability of the jobs themselves. If this happens, the project as currently structured may never be implemented because the ex-combatants will simply not take the offered jobs. On the other, and possibly more serious in a post-conflict situation, it sends a message to the ex-combatants that when we consider their needs, we feel that we have to go out of our way to treat them poorly. The ex-combatants would likely not be happy about receiving such a message.

Powerlessness

If we accept the project as written, we may have a tendency to blame any faults in it on the donor. "The donor insisted," we might say. This is not the message we should be sending into this society as they attempt to build their responsive democratic systems.

Indeed, if we go along with the donor and the ex-combatants go along with us, then we would be serving to reinforce a series of negative messages about the powerlessness of people in general in the face of power. Other citizens, when they see how we humiliated the ex-combatants – men with guns – may feel that they have no opportunity to make their voices heard.

Belligerence, Tension, Suspicion

In the donor's response to our initial query about the project, there is a definite note of hostility. They are expressing a sense of exasperation at the difficulties of working in a post-conflict environment, where many of their decisions are being questioned or challenged. They are, no doubt, being pressured by both the host government and their own to do something concrete about security as soon as possible. They feel that our objections are lazy and typical NGO blather. It is up to us to demonstrate that we have thought through the potential consequences of this project and to help them to shift the focus of the project to something more effective and sustainable.

If we were to implement the project, we might very well feel that the donor had forced us into this implementation. We would find ourselves frustrated and annoyed and we might ourselves take it out on the ex-combatants. When some of them perhaps object to the actual job being offered or to the process involved in hiring or the salary or any of a host of things, we may very well have the same response as the donor. In a post-conflict situation, and especially with these men, this could have negative consequences.

Potential Options

Please note that this section is far from exhausted.

What are some options for making this project more responsive to our concerns?

- Hire the ex-combatants to be supervisors.
 - Hire a mix of people, including ex-combatants, but don't make that the only criteria (perhaps, one ex-combatant for every one person from the neighborhood?)
 - Help the ex-combatants set up private companies to take care of garbage collection.
 - Change the mechanism from garbage collection to something else, e.g. perhaps some sort of vocational training.
-

Optional: Additional Information

This information may be added to the exercise for additional complexity.

There are two other NGOs currently running projects to remove garbage in the capital city.

They are about to run out of funding and are preparing for the ending of their projects. The project proposed to us is supposed to follow on these other projects.

The current salary level for garbage collection is \$2/day.