

The *Umwelt* and Networks of Archetypal Images: A Jungian Approach to Therapeutic Encounters in Humanitarian Contexts*

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ABSTRACT *This paper attempts to develop a new framework within which to comprehend the interrelationship between the 'inner' and 'external' worlds, between the personal and social, and among the intra-/inter-/trans-psychic realms. It proposes the Umwelt as a heuristic concept to grasp and formulate these interconnections. Then, it argues that if we expand the Jungian theory of archetypes by introducing the concepts of 'network of archetypal images' and 'collective structures of meaning', it is possible to develop a more coherent framework to address 'therapeutic encounters' in the context of humanitarian work. The process of 'therapeutic encounter' is distinguished from 'doing therapy'. An example of such an encounter is offered and a new reading is suggested of processes and phenomena that are often examined through existing approaches. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.*

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Any attempt to relate the psychological realm with the wider socio-political realities is fraught with difficulties that are not only due to their different epistemologies. Psychologizing the social and politicizing the psychological are common methodological errors in such endeavours. There is an increasing effort to develop apposite approaches that would enable more appropriate interrelationships between these two realms and this paper aims to articulate such an approach.

Psychodynamic approaches find it particularly difficult to relate intrapsychic phenomena to the external world. It seems that in order to lay down the foundations of their theory, the founding fathers and mothers of these approaches had to concentrate on the minutiae of the intrapsychic processes (i.e., emphasizing the various facets of unconscious mechanisms) that constituted the very building blocks of their opus; consequently, any consideration about the ways these related to the external realities was of secondary importance. Inevitably, as their theories grew so did their aspirations to expand the range of the applicability of their ideas to include their connection with social dimensions. In effect, considerations about the

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social realm were almost an afterthought and not central to their original undertaking. This seems to be more evident whenever psychodynamic theories venture into commenting specifically about social phenomena – these comments tend to be expressed in formulations that appear to be speculative, regardless of their imaginative appeal.

It can be argued that Jung was one of the exceptions to this pattern. The central ideas of his work, the collective unconscious and the archetypes, are, essentially, addressing the very interface between the intrapsychic and social / collective realms (Papadopoulos, 1996, 2009). What Jung called ‘the collective’ was pivotal in the main body of his theories, after he broke away from Freud and started developing his own distinctive paradigm. Jung contrasted the ‘collective’ to what he termed the ‘personal’, without ever offering a precise definition of either of them. Nevertheless, it seems that there would not be much controversy if it was argued that for Jung the ‘collective’ included both the biological as well as the social realms; it encompassed nature, society and culture, i.e., the entirety of the surrounding lived environment that the individual interacts with, the physical world as well as the realm of ideas and beliefs. In a sense, it can be argued that a uniqueness of the Jungian contribution is its intrinsic ability to address this very interaction among all these different realms (Papadopoulos, 1998, 2006c). At the same time, the lack of any clear definition of what constitutes ‘the collective’ in Jung can create confusion that has important implications.

A central paradox needs to be identified in relation to this strength of the Jungian opus. On the one hand, Jung’s *theorizing* extended to offering plentiful commentaries on wider societal, cultural, spiritual and political issues yet, on the other hand, his own *practice* was limited to his clinical/analytical work with individuals. Therefore, all his commentaries about societal phenomena are extrapolations from his own theoretical framework that he forged on the basis of his clinical experience and it is perhaps this speculative quality of these remarks of his that creates the controversies surrounding the Jungian opus – some find their imaginative power attractive, whereas others find them baseless and idiosyncratic opinions.

The same paradox seems to characterize the Jungian field at large. Whereas the majority of Jungians’ *practice* is confined to clinical work in their consulting rooms (and more recently, also to academic work in seminar rooms, but not particularly in field social research), their *theorizing* roams freely, embracing almost every facet of human activity. It is only relatively recently that a handful of Jungian analysts started becoming engaged in actual humanitarian work and social action.

This paper endeavours to explore some more coherent ways of connecting Jungian ideas with the societal/‘collective’ dimension in general, and with humanitarian work in particular. This will be undertaken by introducing a concept that refers to a realm that incorporates, and indeed blends, both ‘internal’ and ‘external’ dimensions in a unique way. This concept is the *Umwelt*, which, although Jung himself never employed, it will be argued that it can provide a most useful framework within which Jungian ideas can be extended in order to be interconnected more meaningfully with the social realities. Crucial in this new framework to understand these interactions will be the processes enabled by the ‘network of archetypal images’.

Ultimately, this paper does not aim to validate Jung or not but to demonstrate the potential that his theories can have (once they are extended) in addressing the interrelationship between the psychological and the social. In doing so, it will be argued that the archetypal realms can be best understood as located within the bio-semiotic sphere that the *Umwelt* delineates, rather than in crude dualistic formulations that position them either in the neurobiological or social realms.

THE *UMWELT*

In the history of ideas often new concepts need to be introduced in order to account for new phenomena. Yet what also happens is that old or semi-forgotten concepts are revisited and new potentialities are attributed to them in the light of updated theoretical developments.

Although the concept of *Umwelt* does not seem to be popular nowadays in the mainstream psychological literature, it will be argued that it has a most heuristic value in bridging the intrapsychic with the social realms. Although usually the *Umwelt* is associated with existential (cf. Binswanger, 1963; Frie, 2010) and phenomenological (cf. Heidegger; 1927; Konopka, 2009) approaches to psychology, it certainly had a long and varied history not only in psychology but also in physical, social, human and environmental sciences.

Umwelt literally means the world around (*um* – around, and *welt* – world) and it refers to the environment that surrounds a person. In colloquial German it refers to ‘the whole class of external factors capable of influencing behaviour, as contrasted with hereditary influences’ (Harré and Lamb, 1986, 162). However, such a term raises several questions: What is this world? Who perceives and decides that this is the ‘surrounding world’? What is this world’s relationship to the person that it surrounds? In short, *Umwelt*, being the surrounding environment of an individual, cannot possibly refer to every single facet of the actual environment within which a person is located, but only to that segment of the environment that one experiences, to the part of the environment that is of relevance to an individual. This means that the term *Umwelt* forces us to make finer differentiations of the crude division (which is often taken for granted) between what is referred to as our ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ worlds, between what we perceive as ‘inside’ us and what we assume to be ‘outside’ us.

The *Umwelt* is often defined as the ‘umbrella term for all the environmental influences shaping an individual’s behaviour, or the environment as it is experienced by the individual’ (Colman, 2001, 564). Such a definition makes it clear that it does not refer to an ‘objective’ environment in its totality but only to those parts of that environment that affect the individual; but then further questions arise: Is that individual aware of that influence or not? And if not, who decides that certain behaviours of that individual are a result of certain influences from that very environment? Who is the person that observes that influence and what is that Archimedean point, the observation point that lies outside both the ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ worlds of an individual to enable that observation?

The term *Umwelt* was first used by the Estonian biologist Jacob Johann von Uexküll (1864–1944) in 1909. von Uexküll made the clear point that the environment for a certain animal is only that part of the environment that the animal can be aware of because the animal has the required sense organs to sense it, and he used the term *Umwelt* to refer to that species-specific environment. One of the important implications of this formulation is that the animals’ *Umwelt* changes depending on the range of their experience and learning; in other words, as their learning develops their sense organs become more attuned to more facets of their environment, thus increasing the elements of their *Umwelt* that they interact with. Similarly, in the context of humans, what we sense or what we become aware of in our environment does not depend only on the nature of our sense organs and biological endowment but also on our experience, personal history, education, etc. This means that our *Umwelt* changes constantly. The obvious example is that of persons who do not understand a certain language and therefore listening to people speaking that language will not be affecting them

as much as it would if they could understand the language. Thus, by learning that language their *Umwelt* will be expanded and they will be affected by what is said or written in that foreign language.

From a psychological perspective, the *Umwelt* is defined as ‘the circumscribed portion of the environment that is meaningful and effective for a given species and that changes its significance in accordance with the mood operative at a given moment’ (English and English, 1958, 568). This definition takes into consideration the ‘mood operative’, which, of course, changes from moment to moment and varies among individuals. How then are we to understand the predominant suggestion that the *Umwelt* is ‘species specific’, if it constantly changes from individual to individual and at every moment? The implied understanding behind this is that there must be certain limits to the range of what individuals can experience, regardless of their own education and personal history, and it is these limits that are dictated by the restricted capacities of each species.

One of the most pertinent definitions is offered by Harré and Lamb, who characterize the *Umwelt* as ‘the portion or aspect of the environment which is significant for a human or animal being . . . [In humans, it refers to] the subjectively meaningful surroundings of an individual or group’; they emphasize that the *Umwelt* has a ‘social character’ and, more specifically, argue that it consists of what they term ‘ensembles of meaning’ (Harré and Lamb, 1986, 162). The reference to ‘meaning’ is most apt and also moves our understanding of the *Umwelt* to a whole new realm. It is apt because, obviously, persons connect only with those segments of their environment that have some meaning for them, whatever meaning that may be; then, an understanding of the *Umwelt* in terms of meaning opens up the realm of representation, images and communication which are the means through which human learning and experience take place, which then result in the expansion of our *Umwelt*. Indeed, in humans, the way we relate to our environment is mostly mediated by the semiotic realm.

Consequently, it is not surprising that it has been recognized that von Uexküll’s ‘establishing the concept of *Umwelt* has proven to be [a] . . . pioneering accomplishment for the doctrine of signs’ (Deely, 2004, 11). Deely emphasized that ‘an *Umwelt* is not merely the aspects of the environment accessed in sensation . . . [but] . . . the manner in which those aspects are networked together as and to constitute “objects of experience”’ (Deely, 2001, 127). The networks that create our experience include not only components of the physical and natural environment but also of the human world of communication and culture, and it is because of this that Kull states that ‘*Umwelt* is the semiotic world of organism. It includes all the meaningful aspects of the world for a particular organism’ (Kull, 1998, 304). This is so because the way we comprehend and relate to our environment (animate and inanimate) is through the various networks of communication and culture that include verbal and non-verbal language, signs, symbols, images. Therefore it is appropriate to accept the *Umwelt* as a ‘meaning centre’ (cf. Sonesson, 2007) where our biological and meaning-making potentialities interact with our surrounding environment in a coherent whole that can be justly understood as bio-semiotic (cf. Emmeche, 2007).

IMAGOS, ARCHETYPES AND THE INTERRELATED PSYCHIC REALMS

It could be argued that a large part of the Jungian opus was, in effect, aimed at developing an understanding about the ways that we connect with our *Umwelt*, and the conditions that make

part of the *Umwelt* knowable. More specifically, it could be suggested that, in short, Jung's way of addressing these issues was formulated through his theories, which conveyed his acute sensitivity about the interrelationship between the collective and intrapsychic realms.

Even from the early stages of his career, Jung recognized an 'objective' surrounding environment that interacted 'subjectively' with the individual, thus creating a close interactional loop between the individual and the environment, resulting in the construction of meaning for the person. Later, of course, these ideas developed into the more mature formulations of the 'collective unconscious'. However, it is instructive to follow Jung's thinking when he first started articulating this process.

Jung's understanding of the *imago* implied an unconscious that was not repressed but was 'objectively' standing 'outside' the person's individual experience. This early understanding could be related to the process that Freud termed as 'foreclosed'. Freud used the term *Verwerfung* (and Lacan elaborated it further) to refer, essentially, to the outcome of primal repression where mental ideational presentations are excluded (foreclosed) from entering a person's unconscious; foreclosure (*Verwerfung*) is the process by which 'signifiers are not integrated into the subject's unconscious' and, therefore, they 'do not return "from the inside" – they re-emerge . . . particularly through the phenomenon of hallucination' (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1973, 166). The Jungian *imagos* are mental presentations of the same type insofar as they were also not integrated in the personal unconscious and, consequently, they do not emerge from a person's unconscious. However, Jung does not emphasize the hallucinatory process as the way that *imagos* (re)appear; instead, he emphasizes another process.

In discussing the parental *imagos*, Jung notes that it would be wrong to consider that 'all those things which take the place of the parents are nothing but a substitute for the unavoidable loss of the parental *imagos*' and clarifies that 'What appears in their stead is not just a substitute, but a reality that is interwoven with the parents and has impressed itself on the mind of the child through the parental *imago*'. The examples he gives of this process include 'The mother who gives warmth, protection, and nourishment [and who] is also the hearth, the sheltering cave or hut, and the surrounding vegetation. She is the provident field, and her son is the godlike grain, the brother and friend of man' (Jung, 1931, para. 67). According to him, during the course of human development, the child gradually becomes aware that 'The earth he plays with, the fire he warms himself at, the rain and wind that chill him, were always realities, but because of his twilight consciousness they were seen and understood only as qualities of the parents. Then, as out of a mist, there emerge the material and dynamic aspects of the earth, revealing themselves as powers in their own right, and no longer wearing the mask of the parents. They are thus not a substitute but a reality that corresponds to a higher level of consciousness' (Jung, 1931, para. 68).

This means that Jung observes that the parental *imagos*, although they are triggered by personal experiences, nevertheless inevitably connect with actual existing realities from our environment – not just any natural realities but only those that form part of the essential and typical human experiences. In this way, a personal experience of the mother connects with the themes, the motifs of 'warmth, protection, and nourishment', which can also be activated by other sources, other stimuli and, in this way, the two sets of signifiers connect with each other, i.e. (in this example), the mental representations of mother and of mother earth, of the hearth, of vegetation and grain, etc.

Moreover, Jung introduces another important idea here; i.e., any motif or theme is never activated in isolation but as part of a set, of a network of associated motifs. This is what is

underlined by Papadopoulos' suggestion that 'archetypes affect individuals and groups not in isolation but in clusters /networks/constellations' (Papadopoulos, 2006a, 32) and therefore he termed them 'networks of archetypal images' which, he argued, form what he called 'collective structures of meaning' (Papadopoulos, 1996, 2006a).

Jung, in the example above, connects the mother with her son, 'the godlike grain, the brother and friend of man'. So, an initial representation, a signifier (in this example, that of the mother), connects with a network of other signifiers that are grouped together thematically without these associated themes or motifs necessarily having been part of the individual's direct personal experience.

Therefore, for Jung, hallucination is not the only means by which imagos are reactivated; instead, through the maturational process of differentiation, as the 'twilight consciousness' becomes 'clearer', the associated signifiers assume their own independent importance, not as substitutes of the initial stimuli, but in their own right. Jung in no ambiguous terms argues that the associated motifs 'are . . . not a substitute but a reality that corresponds to a higher level of consciousness', i.e., no longer part of the 'twilight consciousness' but a product of a more differentiated consciousness, a 'higher level of consciousness' that also can be understood as an expanded connection with one's *Umwelt*. This means that the chain of associations of archaic motifs extends the person's relationship with one's *Umwelt* without having to encounter these previously unknown parts of the *Umwelt* in the context of personal experiences. Insofar as individuals have the basic species-specific mental capacity (due to the inherited anatomical and physiological brain structures and functions), they will be able to keep expanding their *Umwelt* through the semantic clusters, the 'ensembles of meaning', the 'networks of archetypal images', the 'collective structures of meaning' that enable the extension of awareness.

This understanding made Jung appreciate that, insofar as imagos are no longer connected with the initial parental presentations (they are 'not a substitute') but they are independent, i.e., 'certain components are contained in . . . [them] from the beginning and cannot be reduced to personal experiences' (Jung, 1952, para. 63n), and, moreover, they are connected to a wider network of associated themes/motifs, a new term was necessary to grasp their uniqueness and he then introduced the term 'archetype'. This new term enabled Jung to broaden the imagos to encompass not only presentations of persons but also typical situations and typical themes of human experience (i.e., species- or community-specific). Jung wrote characteristically that 'There are types of *situations* and types of *figures* that repeat themselves frequently and have a corresponding meaning' (Jung, 1941, para. 309). In this way, archetypes are not restricted to parental imagos or representations of just persons but can also be referring to typical themes, motifs, such as nurturing or the journey or victimhood.

Jung clarifies this process further when he discusses the mythological origins of the mother archetype. He argues that the divisions in mythology between polar opposites 'point to the unconscious as their place of origin' and asks 'How else could it have occurred to man to divide the cosmos, on the analogy of day and night . . . , unless he had the prototype of such division in himself, in the polarity between the conscious and the invisible and unknowable unconscious?' Then, he goes on to argue that 'Primitive man's perception of objects is conditioned only partly by the objective behaviour of the things themselves, whereas a much greater part is often played by intrapsychic facts which are not related to the external objects except by way of projection' (Jung, 1954, para. 187).

This is a strong argument. Leaving aside Jung's controversial equation between the process of gaining consciousness in an infant and in 'the primitive man', the point he is making here is that human awareness develops on the basis of pre-existing 'intrapyschic facts', of human species-specific 'prototype' structures which are not products of personal experience but, instead, create the very preconditions for enabling us to register certain objects, events and situations and experience them. Jung clarifies that 'this "inside," which modern rationalism is so eager to derive from "outside," has an *a priori* structure of its own that antedates all conscious experience. It is quite impossible to conceive how "experience" in the widest sense, or, for that matter, anything psychic, could originate exclusively in the outside world', and concludes his argument by stressing that 'The psyche . . . has its own peculiar structure and form like every other organism' (Jung, 1954, para. 187).

This discussion shows that Jung's understanding of the archetypes completes his theory of 'prototype' structures that create the *a priori* conditions for the development of the infant's connection with its *Umwelt*. Nothing can be experienced or even registered from 'outside' unless there is some precondition 'inside' to make it knowable. Archetypes are, for Jung, impersonal in the sense that they are not based on a person's individual experience and are, therefore, collective, trans-personal, although once activated, they are experienced by each individual in a unique, personal way. Moreover, they are instrumental and formative in creating the *a priori* conditions needed to experience certain external phenomena and relate them to each person's intrapsychic world.

Therefore, it can be said that with the introduction of the archetype, the Jungian opus addresses not only the intrapsychic realm and not only the trans-psychic realm but it provides the means to interrelate the collective and trans-personal realms with the intrapsychic and interpersonal ones. In effect, we could say that Jungian psychology addresses the *intra-/inter-/trans-psychic* realms.

In this way, it could be argued that Jung understands the *Umwelt* in terms of the set (network, cluster) of interactions where the *a priori* prototype structures that are shared by all humans interrelate with the 'external' and 'internal' experiences. The archetype provides, for Jung, that Archimedean point outside the 'inner' and the 'outer' as it includes both but is neither 'inside' nor 'outside'. The individual is not aware in a conscious way of what one is capable of knowing from one's *Umwelt* until the clusters of the *a priori* prototypes of the 'network of archetypal images', of the 'collective structures of meaning' begin to interact with the external world and the individual. It is then that meaning is derived in a way that interconnects the *intra-/inter-/trans-psychic* realms and in this way the *Umwelt* expands.

If this line of argument is followed, then the polarized debates about whether the archetypes are part of the biological 'collective' or the social 'collective' lose their relevance, if not rendered redundant. Insofar as the Jungian 'collective' is understood in the context of a subjective external environment, i.e., the *Umwelt*, the biological and semiotic dimensions are so inexorably closely interlinked that they transcend the perceived sharp binary division between 'internal' and 'external', neuroanatomical and cognitive, personal and cultural, inherited and learned, based in early infancy and socially constructed.

ABDI, THE SOMALI REFUGEE

In one of my consultancy assignments abroad, in 2008, I was invited to assist with the development of psychosocial services for refugees in the Republic of Yemen. This United

Nations-sponsored project was subcontracted via the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) to the Danish Refugee Council, which invited me to assess the existing situation and services, propose a framework for developing appropriate services that would enable the formation of a specialist unit to address the psychosocial needs of refugees in Yemen, and be responsible for the setting up of the relevant structures, training local trainers and monitoring the effectiveness of these services. The task was daunting both in terms of its size and its complexity. It is beyond the scope of this paper to describe the details of the project. Instead, I will offer some illustrations of how a Jungian approach based on the theoretical analysis provided above can be applied to inform our interventions.

The rationale is this: if we wish to examine the dynamics of our relationship with the *Umwelt*, the interaction between the 'internal' and 'external', the interplay among the intrapsychic, trans-personal and inter-personal realms, it will be easier to study situations where the external realities are clearly visible to the point that they are even overwhelming and defining. Being a refugee is one of these situations where the external reality is so crushingly deterministic, and it is for this reason that I have chosen to present and discuss an example from this type of work, rather than choose material from my analytical private practice or from my clinical practice at the Tavistock Clinic.

To begin with, it is important to be mindful of the context. Africans (mainly Somalis but also some Ethiopians and others) flee their war-torn countries in search of safety, for a future for themselves and their families and attempt the hazardous crossing of the Gulf of Aden to reach Yemen. Often, their plan is then to move on from Yemen to, ideally, countries of the European Union where they hope to find employment (legally or usually illegally) and then bring their families along to join them. Somalia has been involved in an endless and bloody civil war (which occasionally also involves outside military interventions), ever since its president Mohamed Siad Barre was overthrown in 1991. In 2008 the fighting intensified, with shockingly high numbers of civilian casualties, forcing a substantial proportion of the population to flee their homes, either moving to other parts of Somalia or seeking asylum in other countries. The crossing from Africa to Yemen is one of the most established routes of escaping the war. During the first 8 months of 2008 an estimate of 24,000 refugees landed on the Yemeni shores, which is nearly three times more than the number of refugees that had arrived in that country during the previous year; in addition, more than 700 refugees died along the way and another 700 went missing. During the month of August only, 1700 refugees crossed in 59 boats from Africa to Yemen. All these, of course, are conservative estimates as nobody has the precise figures.

The sea crossing is extremely dangerous not only from sailing hazards but mainly from the hardships and, indeed, abuses, refugees are subjected to by the smugglers who carry them on their boats. Documented abuses include beatings, stabbings, shootings, rape, drowning, and neglect causing dehydration, burns, and suffocation. The violence perpetrated on board is often a result of the smugglers allegedly enforcing discipline to prevent boats from capsizing, as they are so overcrowded. Also, when the boats approach the Yemeni coast, the smugglers, wanting to rush back to international waters fearing arrest, push the refugees off the boats, forcing them to swim to the shore, resulting in many refugees drowning.

On arrival, refugees find minimal, if any, assistance and support. Yemen is the poorest country in the Middle East (one of the poorest in the world), with 45% of its population below the poverty line, 49% unemployment, and with only 35% of the population having access to safe drinking water. 71% of women in Yemen are illiterate and 31% of men

(the average female illiteracy rate in the Middle East is 35%) and there is no minimum marriage age for women. A mere 2.9% of the land in Yemen is arable and out of this 0.3% is planted with permanent crops. The rest is arid or semi-arid land and the majority is just desert. These sample figures give a glimpse of the country where the African refugees seek refuge. Despite the state's efforts and remarkably positive attitude towards refugees, the reality is that Yemen has severely limited resources in every respect. The services that refugees encounter are extremely understaffed and under-resourced, and their members of staff are overstretched and insufficiently trained. This situation creates a constant tension between staff and refugees, each accusing each other of not appreciating their own difficult position and objective realities, and of making things worse.

It is in this climate that I met with Abdi (not his real name). Abdi had crossed from Somalia to Yemen 9 months earlier and he was barely surviving in Al-Basateen, one of the worst slums in the world, on the outskirts of Aden, where about 15,000 refugees live in squalid conditions – open sewage, refuse heaps everywhere, without elementary services or sanitation, and with virtually no basic infrastructure. UNHCR, in close collaboration with the Somali tribal elders and its partner agencies, do their best to provide the bare essentials for the survival of the refugees through micro-credit and self-reliance projects. UNHCR also has a small office in Al-Basateen that offers the only free medical services available in the area and they employ the only psychiatrist serving the entire refugee population in the whole of Yemen.

UNCHR and the other agencies kept asking me to see Abdi because he had serious psychological problems; he was very traumatized and very agitated and there was nothing they could do to help him. Besides, they gave me to understand, in no unclear terms, that they had had enough of him 'pestering them' all the time. The staff from these agencies sounded desperate. Finally, I arranged to meet him and I was surprised as I was expecting to see a fierce and intimidating man; instead, I saw a young man in his late twenties with gentle features and respectful manners, despite his evident distress.

It is important to note the space where we met. It was arranged that he would come to see me at the office of one of the partner agencies in Al-Basateen. By 'office', I mean two small, low-ceiling rooms with clean whitewashed walls and cement floor. The only furniture in the room where we met was a desk and a few chairs. There must have been about ten people in the room, most of them busy with some work, talking loudly. The outside temperature was scorching – nearly 50 °C – and it was very humid. When Abdi entered, I looked around and placed two chairs near each other in a corner of the room, inviting him to sit with his back to the others. I sat opposite him with our knees almost touching. About three or four persons were sitting around us, listening to our conversation; others were busy with their own work or moving around the room, listening to us for a while and then attending to something else before returning to their chairs and continuing to listen to us. I did not try to intervene in any way, leaving them to do whatever they wished. After all, although I was the visiting consultant, I was in their territory. Whenever I work abroad in these types of settings I do my utmost to be extremely sensitive and respectful, not imposing anything on the staff who work locally. Also, in these settings where there are no designated therapeutic spaces, I find it important to attempt to improvise and create, as much as possible, a *temenos*, a therapeutic space, however imperfect and temporary.

Ultimately, it is essential to emphasize that this type of intervention does not constitute psychotherapy (and far less, analysis) but it is one of the many forms of what I call 'therapeutic

encounters'; i.e., these are endeavours to 'introduce a therapeutic dimension', instead of 'doing therapy', whenever appropriate in improvised settings in field humanitarian work. This is a unique form of therapeutic work that has been identified and elaborated by Papadopoulos (2010).

To begin with, Abdi talked incessantly and loudly, hardly looking at me, accusing everybody of not helping him and getting increasingly angry with all persons in authority.

His narrative was not very coherent, mixing elements of the tragic circumstances that drove him to become a refugee, recounting bits and pieces of terrible events of his history (back in Somalia, during the flight and in Yemen) and interspersing them with accounts of frustrating meetings with various agencies in Yemen, descriptions of cruel officials, all intermingled with expressions and, indeed, outbursts of rage, frustration and helplessness. In effect, he was working himself up in a way that was sinking him deeper and deeper into a pit of hopelessness. Not unexpectedly, at that point he started hinting at suicide – since there was nothing he or anybody could do to help him, what was the point of carrying on living? The despair was unbearably weighty.

His basic story, without going into details (which I could not follow much, in any case), was that he was a happy man leading an ordinary and comfortable life with his wife and two young children (one a newborn) with a good job, when militia attacked the area where he was living. In the confusion, as they were all fleeing for their lives, he was trying desperately to remain close to his wife and children but the crowd pushed him away and he lost contact with them. He had never seen them since and did not know whether they were alive or dead. Many of those fleeing were killed and he was hoping that at least one member of his family had survived. He ended up in an IDP (internally displaced persons) camp, run by a humanitarian agency, where he spent a couple of months living under terrible conditions. He was driven insane by his worries about his family and frantically struggled to find them or obtain any news about them. All in vain – nobody could help him. Then, he decided to flee across to Yemen, work, get money to help him return and find his family. The crossing was extremely perilous and it was a miracle he survived it. He was hoping Yemen would provide him with a solution to his difficulties but, instead, he felt trapped in a place where he could not secure even his own survival. He was sleeping rough for a long time and was close to dying when he contacted another humanitarian organization and moved to Al-Basateen, where he was given shelter and meagre food rations.

My own initial reaction was that of a great shock. I could not believe that I was unable to connect with him in any way. I found it difficult to accept that he was so enwrapped in his own world and so dismissive of me before he even got to know anything about me. That filled me with anger with myself and then with despair. During that phase, I did not exist for him. My presence had not altered his *Umwelt*; he had not registered me as an encountered other, as a different human being. For him, I was just another nameless official, one more on the list of those who had failed him. He treated me as such without even allowing himself to see whether I could do or say or be anything different from his previous experience of other similar figures (not persons) in authority. He felt powerless and he cast me in the position of those in power who refused to help him and were wilfully and heartlessly extending his state of limbo and thus, in effect, torturing him.

Unwittingly, Abdi was creating a closed loop, entrapping himself in a vicious circle: he felt that I was not going to do anything different from what he had experienced before and,

therefore for him, I did not exist as a person, never mind as a person who could possibly help him; and since I did not exist, I could not offer him anything different. In that way he had foreclosed any contact with me and he even foreclosed my very existence. Inevitably, this was also having a strong impact on me, recreating an isomorphic circularity: I also felt that I did not exist – I felt I had no space to be not only with him but also to just be as a human being; I felt suffocated by him, by the room, by the heat, by the dust and the sun, by the people around me, by his demands and accusations and by his terrible story. I felt crushed into non-existence. I felt I was cast into a role that was so appallingly inhuman that it paralysed me, and the more I was paralysed by that role the more I felt I had nothing to offer, and the more I felt I had nothing to offer, the more I felt I did not exist – I was nothing. Soon, I was sinking into a paralytic feeling that there was nothing that I could do to alleviate any of his pain or effect any change or help him meet any of his multiple needs or minimize in any way his compound deprivation. It was a terrible state to be in and, of course, this was also what he must have been feeling.

Gradually, it dawned on me that, at least, I had to understand as clearly as I could what he was saying and what he was trying to convey. He was speaking in reasonably good English but with a very strong accent and he was talking quite fast. I was struggling to follow but was now doing my best to discern every word of his, concentrating very hard. I began to gently pause him, requesting clarification of what he was saying, at times articulating what I had understood and checking with him whether I was right or not. In this way, we both became more engaged with each other, endeavouring to make ourselves understood, as much as possible. Gradually, our interaction was changing. Needless to say, I did not venture any solutions nor interpretations – only I tried to understand what he was saying, what had happened to him, trying to grasp events in their right time sequence and sense the emotional impact they had on him. Although there were gaps in my understanding of the full story, slowly I was beginning to form a reasonably coherent picture of the events as well as of his experience and feelings about those events. The effect of this shared concentration to understand and follow each other seemed to have a calming effect on both of us and enabled him to become more coherent; also an elementary form of dialogue between us was beginning to take place.

At about that stage of our 'session', Abdi started introducing (in between the other elements of his narrative) a list of symptoms he was suffering from: headaches, insomnia, lack of concentration, flashbacks of the terrible events, lack of appetite, disturbing dreams about his family, etc. But also he complained of being hungry most of the time, bored, isolated and frightened about his own survival and future. Again, I was pausing him, trying to understand more clearly and more precisely what was happening to him, under what conditions, etc. Not surprisingly, his agitation and confusion of narratives were beginning to lessen and there was more eye contact between us. At that point I noticed that our bodies (his and mine) were leaning forward with our heads almost touching, forming an arc of human contact, as if we were moulding our own private space within that public area with the other people around us.

Having survived my own unbearable despair and helplessness, my overall stance was becoming clearer. I felt that his reactions were perfectly understandable, given the enormity of his losses, his deprivation, his disorientation, his refusal to give up the memory of his family. It was only human for him to compare the two parts of his life (before and after losing

his family and fleeing his country) and to feel angry that he had lost his paradise and was driven out to an inhuman desert. I did not make any interpretations, no big comments – just small responses to what he was saying, conveying my overall position that (a) I understood totally his predicament (although I could not know all the details), and (b) I felt that it was perfectly understandable, under the circumstances, that he felt the anger, desperation, hopelessness and all the other feelings he did.

Gradually, we began to feel an incredibly powerful human and warm bond between us that was palpable. Tears started trickling down his cheeks and I was struggling to hold back my own tears, but it must have been pretty transparent to him that I was sharing his feelings. The tone of his voice had changed and we were talking almost in whispers, with long pauses in between. I have no doubt that we both felt like not ending our ‘session’ but I knew that we had to move on.

During this phase I realized that, in fact, he had university qualifications in accounting and he had many skills that he had not put to use ever since the devastating events of his uprooting. So, I asked the staff who were listening to us whether there were any opportunities where he could offer his services – to begin with, in a voluntary capacity. They assured me that he could definitely be given certain responsibilities. This pleased him immensely; he did not seem to have done anything like that before. Prior to the devastating events, he was an ordinary man getting on with his job but not caring much for others. It was the very first time, he said, since he became a refugee that he had felt good, knowing that he could be of help to somebody else. I ended the ‘session’ by promising to meet him again during my following visit in a few months’ time and asked staff to ensure that this happened.

INITIAL AND SECONDARY RESPONSES TO ADVERSITY

There are many facets of this ‘therapeutic encounter’ that are of interest but we will focus only on some of those that are relevant to the central theme of this paper. To remind the reader, this paper is not about trauma or about the archetype of the victim or about the nature of ‘therapeutic encounters’ in field humanitarian work or about any of the many themes that this paper intersects – instead, it is about the understanding of the *Umwelt* as a useful framework within which an extended Jungian approach can help us grasp the interactions between the *intra-/inter-/trans-psyche* realms.

Although Abdi’s external reality was so harshly defining, the claim is that it was, nevertheless, the way his *Umwelt* was constructed that affected him most (regardless of the specific themes within the *Umwelt*) and it was through the *Umwelt* that the changes took place.

To begin with, it could be argued that the staff’s negative attitude towards Abdi could be understood as the outcome of their being drawn into a network of archetypal images around the motif of the victim, and it appears that the same network was activated during the initial parts of my ‘session’ with him. In short, Abdi’s predicament and his own response to his predicament seemed to activate the image or archetype of victim, and everybody who was meaningfully connected with him tended to be sucked into that cluster of images and, in turn, reinforcing it in different ways.

It is important to clarify that, in line with the theoretical discussion above, by image (in the context of a network of archetypal images) I refer not only to a pictorial and graphic image

but to a cluster of perceptions, thoughts, ideas, feelings, behaviours, reactions, relationships, interactions and identities that are directly organized by a central motif in various combinations and variations (cf. Barlow et al., 1990). Moreover, these networks connect and interact with the existing ‘collective structures of meaning’ at all levels (including that of the body) that exist in language, in culture – the pool of symbolized shared experiences and beliefs that are part of collective formations of semiotic presentation.

Undeniably, Abdi was objectively the victim of actual horrific acts of violence that disrupted his life. These were external factual events. Each person reacts in his own way to these calamities, depending on a combination of factors that include personal history and personality characteristics, supporting systems, gender, power positions, the meaning (e.g., political, religious, philosophical) that is attributed to events, hope or lack of hope, current conditions, circumstances and relationships, as well as future prospects.

The individual’s response to adversity consists of finite acts and follows its own logic based on various combinations of these factors. However, it is what happens after the initial response that is of greater interest because, depending on what follows, the initial response acquires a certain meaning that tends to become fixed and it begins to have an independent life of its own, interacting with wider pools of meaning. Then, depending on what happens in that interaction, the initial response acquires a more permanent shape and quality. Often, the secondary shape and meaning that the initial response acquires is not directly relevant to the original stimulus that produced the primary response in the first place. Nevertheless, mistakenly, it is usually assumed that the secondary meaning is a direct outcome of the original stimulus.

For example, an external adversity (a) e.g., an attack by militia (external event – the cause) results in (b) the death of family members (the external effects), (c) forces the father to run away to save his life and to become a refugee (external consequences), and (d) the father is overwhelmed by grief and anger (emotional consequences). The father’s grief and anger are the initial response to the adversity, i.e., (a), (b) and (c). Now, the father will certainly never forget this horrific series of events and their consequences. However, there are many ways that he can position himself as a result of them. For example, in relation to *external activities*, (i) he may become energized and devote his life to seeking revenge on the perpetrators in order to prevent them from committing more atrocities, or (ii) he may become energized and devote his life to seek reconciliation in order to stop the hatred that destroyed his family, or (iii) he may switch off from political issues and devote himself to his own private world. In relation to *his own feelings* about the devastating events and their consequences, the father (i) may react negatively and develop psychological or psychiatric symptoms that will destroy him for the rest of his life, or (ii) he may react positively and become strengthened by the adversity and find a deeper meaning in his life – either a philosophical meaning or a religious one or an ideological one or an artistic one, etc., or (iii) he may remain the same and get on with life, retaining the same stance on life as before. These options are not exclusive and they may occur concurrently.

These are some examples of the enormously wide range of possible responses to the adversity. The point is that when we see each one of these responses on its own, we have the illusion that not only is it perfectly understandable that the father reacted like that, but, more importantly, we erroneously believe that that particular response was the only logical direct effect of the initial cause, the original stimulus. Colloquial expressions convey this certainty, e.g., ‘surely, after what happened to him, it was expected that he would . . .’. Yet, despite the

fact that each one of the possible outcomes is completely different from the other and often outright contradictory, we always have the illusion that that particular outcome was the only possible and logical outcome.

In other words, there is an epistemological illusion at play here that makes us believe that each response was the only possible outcome of the one and the same initial cause. How do we understand this illusion? To begin with, we need to be reminded that all these possible outcomes are not the direct effects of the initial cause but the effects of the way that the initial response was processed. This is the first epistemological error, i.e., to confuse the secondary meaning (given to the primary response) with the primary response itself. In the example above, the father's grief and anger remain the initial response to the primary cause, but the wide variety of subsequent possible outcomes is the direct result of the meaning given to the initial response. The second epistemological error is committed when we forget the complexity of the way the initial response is processed.

In brief, the initial response is processed by at least three groups of factors: (a) the way that others perceive the individual's response; (b) the way the same individual perceives his/her own response; and (c) the way that the central motifs of the response connect with the 'collective structures of meaning' of that particular community, culture and society. Inevitably, all three are not only interconnected in a passive way but in a reciprocally activating way; i.e., one activates the others.

In Abdi's case, his own primary response was that of grief and anger. Given that he did not have any supporting systems, not much hope for the future and felt that he was in a powerless and isolated position, his rage kept escalating. He did not seem to have any strong religious or political ideology that would have influenced his response, so he experienced his adversity in a raw and reactive way. This is how we could understand the 'logic' of his initial response to adversity. This could be understood as a straightforward 'cause' and 'effect' situation of a linear epistemology; i.e., the initial cause (the attack by militia) has the effect of grief and anger as the initial response, given the various factors that affect the way that that particular person experiences adversity.

(a) Now, Abdi's grief and anger inevitably affect others who come into contact with him, such as the staff of the various agencies and organizations working with refugees. All psychoanalytic theories provide plenty of understanding about the mechanisms we use to distance ourselves from emotional pain that is emanating from others. One of the ways staff sheltered themselves from his unbearable grief was to see him as an obnoxious person, a pest, as well as by labelling him as a psychiatrically disturbed patient.

(b) Studies show that individuals react not only to events but also to the way they perceive their own reactions to these events, i.e., the secondary meaning we give to our own initial response to the adversity events; moreover, they suggest that the effects of the secondary meaning are much more instrumental in creating psychological problems than the initial ones (e.g., Bartholomew and Wessely, 2002; Durodie and Wessely, 2002). Abdi was clearly overwhelmed by his own reaction of grief and anger and must have wanted to ease it by all means. Again, there are many mechanisms that psychoanalysis identified that we use to protect ourselves from our own excessive emotional pain; all the defence mechanisms can be used to do just that. Abdi seems to have – unconsciously – adopted several such mechanisms. One was to direct his own anger not only to the actual perpetrators (whom he did not know and were back in Somalia) but also redirect it to all persons in authority over him who, in his eyes, were

failing him. By doing this, not only was he masking his pain with anger but he was also finding concrete individuals to discharge his overwhelming feelings onto. Finally, by adopting the identity of a victim he was deriving a number of secondary gains, e.g., not taking responsibility for himself, blaming others for everything, being self-righteous, expecting the world to make it up to him, expecting to draw sympathy from others, justifying his shortcomings. It is important to emphasize that there is a huge difference between reacting as a victim in the context of an actual victimizing situation and adopting the identity of a victim.

(c) As soon as the image of the victim is activated in relation to actual events in a justified way, then the image itself may take over and begin to connect with the network of archetypal images around the motif of the victim, and then everything may spin out of control: roles are then assigned (by the activated network) to the involuntarily participating actors without much logical justification apart from the need that they fit into the network's 'archetypal scenario' (Papadopoulos, 1996, 1999). Then, the network of archetypal images interacts with all the relevant collective structures of meaning and keeps strengthening and solidifying itself by fixing the identities of the recruited (by the network) actors.

As soon as Abdi experienced himself as a victim, then the victim motif became activated and the network of archetypal images began organizing his thoughts, feelings, relationships and his very identity. The order that the network introduced, regardless of its painful ingredients, nevertheless must have provided a welcome way out of the unbearable chaos and disruption Abdi must have experienced following the cruelty of the devastating events.

The key point here is that all these 'clear' positions, i.e., of Abdi's image of himself as a 'victim', staff's perception of Abdi as a 'pest', Abdi's perception of me as a hostile humanitarian worker, etc. are set positions that belong to clearly *a priori*, ready-made networks of archetypal images. Under emotional pressure, the unbearable nature of the initial response to adversity needs to find a settled position that offers some relative relief and the archetypal networks provide just this; therefore, the initial response is transformed into the secondary one that offers the relative comfort of predictability and comprehensibility – in short, it renders the chaos into a meaningful environment, alas, by distorting the initial response and fixing it in potentially more permanent and intelligible positions, regardless of the emotional damage to the person.

UMWELT AND ARCHETYPAL NETWORKS

Stephen Karpman (1968) articulated the victim triangle, a cluster that has been known to humans throughout the ages. This triangle represents an excellent, clear and easily understood example of an *a priori* network of archetypal images. As such, it helps us appreciate the close reciprocal interconnection among the three roles, i.e., victim, perpetrator and rescuer. There can be no victim without a perpetrator and no perpetrator without a victim; similarly, none of them can exist without the rescuer and the rescuer cannot exist if the first two were not there in the first place. This archetypal set of interrelationships of roles tends to become more entrenched and even fossilized when they connect with wider systems of meaning, with ideologies that render meaningful these roles. For example, Abdi connected with the humanitarian system, which is particularly vulnerable due to the inevitable identification with the rescuer role. In this way, the coupling of the two roles (Abdi's victim role and the

humanitarian staff's rescuer role) made a perfect fit and began to keep reproducing this motif in different variations.

The beginning phase of my 'session' with Abdi was a typical situation where the networks of the archetypal images around the victim motif were rampant. Abdi was just the victim lashing out at all perpetrators. Without any hesitation or consideration, I was cast by his victim role into the perpetrator's role. His identification with the victim role was total, and he said and did nothing that was out of that role. He did not exist as a person – he was just an incarnation of the archetype of the victim. Consequently, I also became a victim, the victim of his impersonal treatment of me. In a sense both of us were victims of the archetypal network of victim images and both of us were dehumanized by it. The more I tried to get out of the asphyxiating network (e.g., by trying to help him out of his role), the more I was sinking into it by becoming his rescuer, which was a complementary role of the same network. In addition, I was also being made to experience the unbearable dehumanization of being an indiscriminate victim. The more he was seeing me as the perpetrator, the more I was seeing him as the perpetrator against me but also as the total victim – quite a confusing situation. Both of us were completely lost in that network and both of us lost our individuality.

It is important to note that these positions were not just the products of our own separate personal unconscious dynamics. Undoubtedly, elements of our personal history and personal unconscious were also drawn into play but these were of minimal importance in comparison to the collective roles that were assigned to us by that network. Nevertheless, the way we connected with these roles was not just in an external way, but we genuinely incarnated those roles (or better – those roles incarnated us) for two reasons.

The first is to do with the fact that this network was related to archaic forms of 'proto-experiences' associated with prototype structures of abandonment and related themes. These are the foreclosed structures that never entered our personal unconscious but remained a-conscious in a non-repressed way. Inevitably, these structures got connected with personal experiences and must have also unearthed elements of our personal histories. However, the forceful and totalitarian grip the victim role had on us can only be explained by the presence of these *a priori* collective structures around similar motifs. There was something beyond us that was driving us.

The second reason has to do with the way that these roles got connected with wider and collective structures of meaning. Even if, according to a hypothetical situation that a person had never experienced victimhood before, it is still possible to connect with it through the various themes, stories, beliefs and rituals around the motif of victim that exist in our particular culture, language, ideology, religion, systems of semiotic presentation, etc. Moreover, these collective structures of meaning have some prototype formulas of how we can react and how we can be positioned, e.g., in time, with the excessive demands the victim makes, the rescuer feels victimized by the very victim that he/she attempts to rescue.

Ultimately, it is the combination of all these reasons together that makes us embody these roles in such a personal way that is also so collective but, nevertheless, unbearably powerful and complete.

What seems to have produced the shift in my 'session' with Abdi was my need to understand better what he was saying – my attempt to concentrate totally in order to grasp his unique story and individuality. Having survived the onslaught of the inhuman grip by the archetypal network, I wanted, in a sense, to cut through the collective role

that had possessed him and see the real person behind it. This attempt started restoring some of my own individuality and also enabled me to begin to see his own individuality. In other terms, I attempted to humanize the archetypes (him – a victim, and me – a perpetrator), to loosen their grip on us and imbue them with personal material. In effect, that led us into developing a dialogue not just simply me hearing the watertight collective formula of his story but, instead, his own unique story with the finer personal feelings and perceptions and contradictions.

Ultimately, the first casualty of trauma is complexity (Papadopoulos, 2002, 2005b, 2008). This means that under the pressure of the traumatic experiences the person resorts to dehumanizing oversimplification and the collective images provide such an easy and simplistic impersonal caricature of a person, e.g., as a victim or as a perpetrator. Therefore, seeking the complexity above the one-dimensional and formulaic narrative that fits into impersonal archetypal patterns, assists in cracking the imprisoning façade of the collective role in order to allow the complexity of individuality to come through.

These steps seem to have gradually begun to liberate us from the clutches of the impersonal and collective roles.

Gradually, I was able to differentiate the variety of Abdi's responses to adversity and discern, in addition to his negative responses, also resilient characteristics as well as other responses that fall under the category of Adversity-Activated Development (AAD) (Papadopoulos, 2005a, 2006b, 2007a, 2007b). It is important to distinguish between resilience and AAD. 'AAD refers to the positive developments that are a direct result of being exposed to adversity' (Papadopoulos, 2007b, 306), whereas resilient characteristics are those positive characteristics that existed prior to adversity and were retained despite the adversity. Abdi's ability to work as an accountant could be regarded as a resilient function, whereas his willingness to assist others could be understood as an AAD function, insofar as it did not exist, apparently, before his exposure to adversity.

So, how did Abdi's *Umwelt* get expanded? After a long period of predictable and settled life, he was faced with a rapid succession of totally new experiences: terrifying violence, loss of his family, loss of his country, arrival in a new country, new position (as a destitute refugee) without his usual status props, meeting humanitarian staff, etc. What was it that informed and formed the way he responded to all these unknown situations? Abdi's lived environment was not only that of the external events but also of the meaning he attributed to them; the *Umwelt* is a bio-semiotic sphere, i.e., it is an ever changing cluster of interrelationships between meaning, events, experiences, body responses, feelings and ideas. If, for example, kindness was not included in the clusters of meaning that were conveyed by the predominant networks of archetypal images that gripped him, then it was not possible for him to 'see' kindness around him; and the other way round, without experiencing kindness in his lived environment he could not include it in his 'inner' world.

It appears that the network of archetypal images provides the ground of prototype structures that introduce some familiarity of what was previously unknown. The paradox is that these networks with their impersonal grip that possess the person, at the same time, also have the capacity to provide the bridge between the previous and present positions. The over-sweeping nature of archetypal possession, once a person survives it and is not lost completely, may in fact, facilitate the passage to the new phase in one's life, thus expanding one's *Umwelt* and making unknown parts known.

The new experiences, on their own, did not expand Abdi's *Umwelt*. They crushed him and ruined him and they were about to destroy his physical life, too. His *Umwelt* did not register them as new experiences but processed them through the prototypical structures as collective and impersonal experiences. He was a victim. That gave some meaning (at least temporarily) to the meaninglessness of the inhumanity that had struck him. It has been argued that the first and necessary phase of the recovery from trauma is to submerge one's individuality and derive meaning from a collective story (Papadopoulos, 1997). In other words, in the case of Abdi, it was easier for him to comprehend that what he suffered was not a result of who he was as a person and human being, but a result of his collective identity; i.e., he happened to be a member of one group that was persecuted by another group. However, the collective stage has to be a transitional one because if one stays there, then one remains fixed as a collective person without one's own uniqueness, individuality, contradictions and irregularities but also without the possibility of further growth and development.

This means that these very impersonal structures have the potentiality of facilitating the processing and digestion of these unbearable new experiences so that eventually they become personal and lived experiences. This can happen if one breaks their oversimplified and impersonal structure of the frozen mask and breathes into them human warmth that can thaw them. This is also achieved with a conscious relationship with them, especially in the context of a human encounter, and this is what seems to have happened with Abdi and me.

Thus the network of archetypal images facilitated Abdi not only to survive his unbearable trauma but also enabled him to expand his *Umwelt* by making unknown parts known. These networks interwove the *intra-/inter-/trans-psychic* realms and ultimately enabled him to move forward enriched by these experiences.

As Jung wrote,

The human psyche is both individual and collective, and . . . its well-being depends on the natural co-operation of these two apparently contradictory sides. Their union is essentially an irrational life process that can, at most, be described in individual cases, but can neither be brought about, nor understood, nor explained rationally. (Jung, 1966, para. 486)

POSTSCRIPT

I am aware that this paper addresses themes and processes that usually are perceived according to many existing theoretical approaches, e.g., Jungian theories of archetypes, psychodynamic theory of trauma, psychosocial methods in humanitarian work. My appeal to the reader is to attempt to refrain from reading them through the existing spectacles and to endeavour to follow the framework that this paper attempts to formulate. It may reveal some unexpected new insights and connections.

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